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Abstract
In this paper, we consider an approach to update nonmonotonic knowledge bases rep-
resented as extended logic programs under the answer set semantics. In this approach,
new information is incorporated into the current knowledge base subject to a causal re-
jection principle, which enforces that, in case of conflicts between rules, more recent rules
are preferred and older rules are overridden. Such a rejection principle is also exploited
in other approaches to update logic programs, notably in the method of dynamic logic
programming, due to Alferes et al.
One of the central issues of this paper is a thorough analysis of various properties of the
current approach, in order to get a better understanding of the inherent causal rejection
principle. For this purpose, we review postulates and principles for update and revision
operators which have been proposed in the area of theory change and nonmonotonic rea-
soning. Moreover, some new properties for approaches to updating logic programs are
considered as well. Like related update approaches, the current semantics does not in-
corporate a notion of minimality of change, so we consider refinements of the semantics
in this direction. As well, we investigate the relationship of our approach to others in
more detail. In particular, we show that the current approach is semantically equivalent
to inheritance programs, which have been independently defined by Buccafurri et al., and
that it coincides with certain classes of dynamic logic programs, for which we provide
characterizations in terms of graph conditions. In view of this analysis, most of our results
about properties of the causal rejection principle apply to each of these approaches as well.
Finally, we also deal with computational issues. Besides a discussion on the computational
complexity of our approach, we outline how the update semantics and its refinements can
be directly implemented on top of existing logic programming systems. In the present
case, we implemented the update approach using the logic programming system DLV.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Context
Logic programming has been conceived as a computational logic paradigm for prob-
lem solving and offers a number of advantages over conventional programming lan-
guages. In particular, it is a well-suited tool for declarative knowledge representation
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and common-sense reasoning (Baral & Gelfond, 1994), and possesses thus a high
potential as a key technology to equip software agents with advanced reasoning
capabilities in order to make those agents behave intelligently (cf., e.g., (Sadri &
Toni, 2000)).
It has been realized, however, that further work is needed on extending the cur-
rent methods and techniques to fully support the needs of agents. In a simple (but,
as for currently deployed agent systems, realistic) setting, an agent’s knowledge
base, KB , may be modeled as a logic program, which the agent may evaluate to
answer queries that arise. Given various approaches to semantics, the problem of
evaluating a logic program is quite well-understood, and (beside Prolog) provers for
semantics with more sophisticated treatment of negation may be used. Currently
available provers include the systems DeRes (Cholewin´ski et al., 1996), DLV (Eiter
et al., 1997a), smodels (Niemela¨ & Simons, 1996), and XSB (Rao et al., 1997).
An important aspect, however, is that an agent is situated in an environment
which is subject to change. This requests the agent to adapt over time, and to
adjust its decision making. An agent might be prompted to adjust its knowledge
base KB after receiving new information in terms of an update U , given by a clause
or a set of clauses that need to be incorporated into KB . Simply adding the rules
of U to KB does not give a satisfactory solution in practice, even in simple cases.
For example, if KB contains the rules a ← b and b ← , and U consists of the
rule ¬a ← stating that a is false, then the union KB ∪ U is not consistent under
predominant semantics such as the answer set semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991)
or the well-founded semantics (Van Gelder et al., 1991). However, by attributing
higher priority to the update ¬a ← , a result is intuitively expected which has a
consistent semantics, where the emerging conflict between old and new information
is resolved.
To address this problem, some approaches for updating logic programs with (sets
of) rules have been proposed recently (Alferes et al., 1998; Alferes et al., 1999; Inoue
& Sakama, 1999; Zhang & Foo, 1998). In this paper, we consider an approach which
is based on a causal rejection principle. According to this principle, a rule r is only
discarded providing there is a “reason” for doing so, in terms of another, more
recent rule r′ which contradicts r. That is, if both r and r′ are applicable (i.e., their
bodies are satisfied) and have opposite heads, then only r′ is applied while r is
discarded. In the example from above, the rule r : a← b in the current knowledge
base KB (whose body is true given rule b← ) is rejected by the new rule r′ : ¬a←
in the update (whose body is also true), and thus in the updated knowledge base,
r is not applied.
The causal rejection principle is not novel—in fact, it constitutes a major in-
gredient of the well-known dynamic logic programming approach (Alferes et al.,
1998; Alferes et al., 2000). Furthermore, it underlies, in slightly different forms, the
related approaches of inheritance logic programs (Buccafurri et al., 1999a) and or-
dered logic programs (Laenens et al., 1990; Buccafurri et al., 1996). We provide here
a simple and rigorous realization of this principle, in terms of “founded” rejection: a
rule r may only be rejected by some other rule r′ which itself is not rejected. While
this foundedness condition, as it appears, plays in effect no role in the particular
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semantics we consider, it can do so for more involved semantics based on causal
rejection, such as the one by Alferes et al. (1998; 2000).
Starting from a simple formalization of a semantics for updating logic programs
based on causal rejection, which offers the advantage of a clear declarative charac-
terization and of a syntactical realization at the same time, the main goal of this
paper is to investigate properties of this semantics, as well as to analyze the rela-
tionship to other semantics for updating logic programs, in particular to dynamic
logic programming. Notice that, although uses and extensions of dynamic logic pro-
gramming have been discussed (cf. (Alferes et al., 1999; Alferes & Pereira, 2000;
Leite et al., 2000)), its properties and relations to other approaches and related
formalisms have been less explored so far (but see (Alferes & Pereira, 2000)).
1.2 Main Contributions
Inspired by ideas in (Alferes et al., 1998; Alferes et al., 2000), we consider a se-
mantics for sequences P = (P1, . . . , Pn) of extended logic programs, in terms of
a syntactic transformation to an update program, which is a single extended logic
program in an extended language. The semantics properly generalizes the answer
set semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) of single logic programs. The readable
syntactic representation of the semantical results—which is useful from a compu-
tational perspective—is complemented, as in (Alferes et al., 1998; Alferes et al.,
1999), by an elegant semantical characterizations in terms of a modified Gelfond-
Lifschitz reduction, resulting from the usual construction by removal of rejected
rules. The transformation we describe is similar to the one by Alferes et al., but
involves only a few types of rules and new atoms. For capturing the rejection prin-
ciple, information about rule rejection is explicitly represented at the object level
through rejection atoms; this is similar to an implementation of the related inher-
itance logic program approach proposed by Buccafurri et al. (1999a). Though not
new in spirit, the approach we suggest offers a more accessible definition and is
suitable for studying general properties of updates by causal rejection, providing
insight in the mechanism of the rejection principle itself.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
(1) We extensively investigate, from different points of view, properties of up-
date programs and answer set semantics for update sequences. We first analyze
them from a belief revision perspective, and evaluate various (sets of) postulates
for revision and iterated revision from the literature (Alchourro´n et al., 1985; Kat-
suno & Mendelzon, 1991; Darwiche & Pearl, 1997; Lehmann, 1995). To this end,
we discuss possible interpretations of update programs as change operators for non-
monotonic logical theories. As it turns out, update programs (and thus equivalent
approaches) do not satisfy many of the properties defined in the literature. This is
partly explained by the nonmonotonicity of logic programs and the causal rejection
principle embodied in the semantics, which strongly depends on the syntax of rules.
Furthermore, we consider properties from a nonmonotonic reasoning perspective,
by naturally interpreting update programs as nonmonotonic consequence relations,
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and review postulates and principles which have been analyzed by Kraus, Lehmann,
and Magidor (1990), and Makinson (1993).
Finally, we present and discuss some further general properties relevant for update
programs. Among them is an iterativity property, which informally states equiva-
lence of nesting ((P1, P2), P3) and sequences (P1, P2, P3) of updates. A possible
interpretation of this property is that an immediate update strategy, which incor-
porates new information immediately into the knowledge base, is equivalent to
demand-driven evaluation, where the actual knowledge base KB is built on demand
of particular queries, and full information about KB ’s update history is known. As
we shall see, the property does not hold in general, but for certain classes of pro-
grams.
(2) As it appears, update answer sets—like related concepts based on causal
rejection—do not respect minimality of change. We thus refine the semantics of
update sequences and introduce minimal answer sets and strictly minimal answer
sets. Informally, in minimal answer sets, the set of rules that need to be rejected is
minimized. This means that a largest set of rules should be respected if an answer
set is built; in particular, if all rules can be satisfied, then no answer sets would
be adopted, which request the rejection of any rule. The notion of strict minimal-
ity further refines minimality by enforcing that rejection of older rules should be
preferred to rejection of newer rules, thus performing hierarchic minimization.
The refined semantics come at the cost of higher computational complexity, and
increase the complexity of update answer sets for propositional programs by one
level, namely from the first to the second level in the polynomial hierarchy. This
parallels similar results for the update semantics by Sakama and Inoue (1999),
which employs a notion of minimality in the basic definition.
(3) We conduct a comparison between update programs and alternative ap-
proaches for updating logic programs (Alferes et al., 1998; Alferes et al., 2000;
Zhang & Foo, 1998; Inoue & Sakama, 1999; Leite & Pereira, 1997; Leite, 1997;
Marek & Truszczyn´ski, 1994) and related approaches (Buccafurri et al., 1999a;
Delgrande et al., 2000). We find that for some of these formalisms, syntactic sub-
classes are semantically equivalent to update programs. Thus, update programs
provide a (different) characterization of these fragments, and by their simplicity,
contribute to better understanding on the essential working of these formalisms
on these fragments. Furthermore, our results on properties of update answer set
semantics carry over to the equivalent fragments, and establish also semantical re-
sults for these formalisms, which have not been analyzed much in this respect so
far. Finally, equivalent fragments of different formalisms are identified via update
programs.
First, we show that update programs are, on the language we consider, equiv-
alent to inheritance logic programs. More precisely, our notion of an answer set
for an update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) coincides with the notion of an answer
set for a corresponding inheritance program P< in the approach by Buccafurri et
al. (1999a), where P< results from P by interpreting more recent updates in the
sequence (P1, . . . , Pn) (i.e., programs with higher index) as programs containing
more specific information. Thus, update programs (and classes of dynamic logic
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programs) may semantically be regarded as fragment of the inheritance framework
of Buccafurri et al. (1999a). We then compare our update programs to revision pro-
gramming by Marek and Truszczyn´ski (1994) and the related approach of Leite and
Pereira (1997), which has been extended to sequences of programs in (Leite, 1997).
It appears that the fragment of this formalism where programs merely use weak
negation is, apart from extra conditions on sequences of more than two programs,
semantically equivalent to update programs. Furthermore, we give a thorough anal-
ysis of the dynamic logic programming approach by Alferes et al. (1998; 2000). Their
notion of model of an update sequence P, which we refer to as dynamic answer set,
semantically imposes extra conditions compared to our update answer set. We give
a precise characterization of the case in which the definitions are equivalent, using
graph-theoretic concepts. From this characterization, we get syntactic conditions for
classes of programs on which dynamic answer sets and update answer sets coincide.
Notice that the examples discussed in (Alferes et al., 1998; Alferes et al., 2000)
satisfy these conditions.1 Furthermore, by this correspondence, some results for
update principles and computational complexity derived for our update programs
carry over to dynamic logic programs as well. Further inspection, which we do not
carry out here, suggests the same results beyond the corresponding fragments.
To the best of our knowledge, no investigation of approaches to updating logic
programs from the perspectives of belief revision and nonmonotonic consequences
relations has been carried out so far. In view of our results about the relationship
between update programs and other approaches, in particular to inheritance logic
programs and fragments of dynamic logic programming, our investigations apply
to these formalisms as well.
1.3 Structure of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. After providing some necessary preliminaries in
the next section, we introduce in Section 3 update programs and answer sets for
such programs, and establish some characterization results. In Section 4, we embark
on our study of general principles of update programs based on causal rejection from
various perspectives. The refinements of answer sets to minimal and strictly minimal
answer sets are considered in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to computational issues
of our approach. After an investigation of the computational complexity of update
programs under the semantics introduced, we discuss an implementation of our
approach based on the DLV logic programming tool (Eiter et al., 1997a; Eiter et al.,
1998). In Section 7, relations to other and related approaches are investigated. The
paper concludes with Section 8, containing a short summary and a discussion of
further work and open issues. Some proofs and further results, which are omitted
here for space reasons, can be found in (Eiter et al., 2000b).
1 In a preliminary version of this paper (Eiter et al., 2000a), we erroneously reported, due to
misunderstanding notation in (Alferes et al., 1998; Alferes et al., 2000), that dynamic logic
programs and update programs are equivalent in general. This view was supported by the
examples mentioned and many others we considered.
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2 Preliminaries
We deal with extended logic programs (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991), which consist of
rules built over a set A of propositional atoms where both default negation not and
strong negation ¬ is available. A literal, L, is either an atom A (a positive literal) or
a strongly negated atom ¬A (a negative literal). For a literal L, the complementary
literal, ¬L, is ¬A if L = A, and A if L = ¬A, for some atom A. For a set S of
literals, we define ¬S = {¬L | L ∈ S}, and denote by LitA the set A ∪ ¬A of all
literals over A. A literal preceded not is called a weakly negated literal.
A rule, r, is an ordered pair L0 ← B(r), where L0 is a literal and B(r) is a
finite set of literals or weakly negated literals. We also allow the case where L0 may
be absent. We call L0 the head of r, denoted H(r), and B(r) the body of r. For
B(r) = {L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln}, we define B+(r) = {L1, . . . , Lm} and
B−(r) = {Lm+1, . . . , Ln}. The elements of B+(r) are referred to as the prerequisites
of r. We employ the usual conventions for writing rules like L0 ← B1 ∪ B2 or
L0 ← B1 ∪ {L} as L0 ← B1, B2 and L0 ← B1, L, respectively. Generally, rule r
with B(r) as above will simply be written as
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln.
If r has an empty head, then r is a constraint ; if the body of r is empty, then r is
a fact ; if n = m (i.e., if r contains no default negation), then r is a basic rule. We
denote by LA the set of all rules constructible using the literals in LitA.
An extended logic program (ELP), P , is a (possibly infinite) set of rules. If all
rules in P are basic, then P is a basic program. Usually, A will simply be understood
as the set of all atoms occurring in P .
An interpretation I is a set of literals which is consistent , i.e., I does not contain
complementary literals A and ¬A. A literal L is true in I (symbolically I |= L) iff
L ∈ I, and false otherwise. Given a rule r, the body B(r) of r is true in I, denote
I |= B(r), iff (i) each L ∈ B+(r) is true in I and (ii) each L ∈ B−(p) is false in I.
Rule r is true in I, denoted I |= r, iff H(r) is true in I whenever B(r) is true in
I. In particular, a constraint r is true in I iff I 6|= B(r). For a program P , I is a
model of P , denoted I |= P , if I |= r for all r ∈ P .
Let r be a rule. Then r+ denotes the basic rule obtained from r by deleting all
weakly negated literals in the body of r, i.e., r+ = H(r) ← B+(r). Furthermore,
we say that rule r is defeated by a set of literals S if some literal in B−(r) is true
in S, i.e., if B−(r) ∩ S 6= ∅. As well, each literal in B−(r) ∩ S is said to defeat r.
The reduct, PS , of a program P relative to a set S of literals is defined by
PS = {r+ | r ∈ Π and r is not defeated by S}.
An interpretation I is an answer set of a program P iff it is a minimal model of
P I . By S(P ) we denote the collection of all answer sets of P . If S(P ) 6= ∅, then P
is said to be satisfiable.
We regard a logic program P as the epistemic state of an agent. The given
semantics is used for assigning a belief set to any epistemic state P as follows.
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Let I ⊆ LitA be an interpretation. Define
BelA(I) = {r ∈ LA | I |= r}.
Furthermore, for a class I of interpretations, let BelA(I) =
⋂
I∈I BelA(I).
Definition 1
For a logic program P , the belief set, BelA(P ), of P is given by BelA(P ) =
BelA(S(P )).
We write P |=A r if r ∈ BelA(P ), and for any program Q, we write P |=A Q if
P |=A q for all q ∈ Q. Programs P1 and P2 are equivalent (modulo A), symbolically
P1 ≡A P2, iff BelA(P1) = BelA(P2). It can be seen that if either P1 or P2 involves
only finitely many atoms, or if A is finite, then P1 ≡A P2 is equivalent to the
condition that P1 and P2 have the same answer sets modulo A. We will drop the
subscript “A ” in BelA(·), |=A, and ≡A if no ambiguity can arise.
Belief sets enjoy the following natural properties:
Theorem 1
For every logic program P , we have that:
(i) P ⊆ Bel(P );
(ii) Bel (Bel(P )) = Bel(P );
(iii) {r | I |= r, for every interpretation I} ⊆ Bel (P ).
Proof
Properties (i) and (iii) hold trivially. Property (ii) can be seen as follows: Bel(P ) ⊆
Bel(Bel (P )) follows directly from property (i), and Bel(Bel (P )) ⊆ Bel(P ) holds
due to the fact that each answer set of P is also an answer set of Bel(P ).
Clearly, the belief operator Bel (·) is nonmonotonic, i.e., in general, P1 ⊆ P2 does
not imply Bel (P1) ⊆ Bel (P2).
3 Update programs
We introduce a framework to update logic programs based on a compilation tech-
nique to ELPs. The basic idea is the following. Given a sequence (P1, . . . , Pn) of
ELPs, each Pi is assumed to update the information expressed by the initial sec-
tion (P1, . . . , Pi−1). The sequence (P1, . . . , Pn) is translated into a single ELP P
′,
respecting the successive update information, such that the answer sets of P ′ rep-
resent the answer sets of (P1, . . . , Pn). The translation is realized by introducing
new atoms rej (·) which control the applicability of rules with respect to the update
information2. Informally, rej (r) states that rule r is “rejected”, in case a more re-
cent rule r′ asserts a conflicting information. This conflict is resolved by enabling
rej (r) to block the applicability of r, and so rule r′ is given precedence over r.
In some sense, the proposed update mechanism can be seen as some form of
2 This idea can be found elsewhere in the literature, e.g., (Kowalski & Toni, 1996; Inoue, 2000)
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an inheritance strategy, where more recent rules are viewed as “more specific” in-
formation, which have to be given preference in case of a conflict. In Section 7.1,
we will discuss the relationship between our update formalism and the inheritance
framework introduced by Buccafurri et al. (1999a).
The general method of expressing update sequences in terms of single programs
has already been discussed by Alferes et al. (1998; 2000). However, in that frame-
work, applicability issues are realized in terms of newly introduced atoms referring
to the derivability of atoms of the original programs, and not to the applicability
of rules as in the present approach. A detailed comparison between our approach
and the method of Alferes et al. (1998; 2000) is given in Section 7.3.
3.1 Basic Approach
By an update sequence, P, we understand a series (P1, . . . , Pn) of ELPs. We say
that P is an update sequence over A iff A represents the set of atoms occurring in
the rules of the constituting elements Pi of P (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Given an update sequenceP = (P1, . . . , Pn) overA, we assume a setA∗ extending
A by new, pairwise distinct atoms rej (r) and Ai, for each r occurring in P, each
atom A ∈ A, and each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We further assume an injective naming function
N(·, ·), which assigns to each rule r in a program Pi a distinguished name, N(r, Pi),
obeying the condition N(r, Pi) 6= N(r
′, Pj) whenever i 6= j. With a slight abuse of
notation we shall identify r with N(r, Pi) as usual. Finally, for a literal L, we write
Li to denote the result of replacing the atomic formula A of L by Ai.
Definition 2
Given an update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over a set of atoms A, we define the
update program P✁ = P1 ✁ . . .✁ Pn over A∗ consisting of the following items:
(i) all constraints in Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
(ii) for each r ∈ Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
Li ← B(r), not rej (r) if H(r) = L;
(iii) for each r ∈ Pi, 1 ≤ i < n:
rej (r) ← B(r),¬Li+1 if H(r) = L;
(iv) for each literal L occurring in P (1 ≤ i < n):
Li ← Li+1; L← L1.
Informally, this program expresses layered derivability of a literal L, beginning at
the top layer Pn downwards to the bottom layer P1. The rule r at layer Pi is only
applicable if it is not refuted by a literal derived at a higher level that is incompatible
with H(r). Inertia rules propagate a locally derived value for L downwards to the
first level, where the local value is made global. The transformation P✁ is modular
in the sense that for P ′ = (P1, . . . , Pn, Pn+1) it augments P✁ = P1 ✁ . . .✁Pn only
with rules depending on n+ 1.
We remark that P✁ can obviously be slightly simplified, which is relevant for
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implementing our approach. All weakly negated literals not rej (r) in rules with
heads Ln can be removed: Indeed, since rej (r) cannot be derived, each such atom
evaluates to false in any answer set of P✁. Thus, no rule from Pn is rejected in an
answer set of P✁, i.e., all most recent rules are obeyed.
The intended answer sets of an update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) are defined in
terms of the answer sets of P✁.
Definition 3
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an update sequence over a set of atoms A. Then, S ⊆ LitA
is an update answer set of P iff S = S′ ∩ A for some answer set S′ of P✁. The
collection of all update answer sets of P is denoted by U(P).
Following the case of single programs, an update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is
regarded as the epistemic state of an agent, and the belief set Bel (P) is given by
Bel(U(P)). The update sequenceP is said to be satisfiable iff U(P) 6= ∅, and P ≡ P′
iff Bel (P) = Bel(P′) (P′ some update sequence). General properties of the belief
operator Bel (·) in the context of update sequences will be discussed in Section 4.
For illustration of Definition 3, consider the following example, adapted from
(Alferes et al., 1998).
Example 1
Consider the update of P1 by P2, where
P1 =
{
r1 : sleep← not tv on, r2 : night← , r3 : tv on← ,
r4 : watch tv← tv on
}
;
P2 =
{
r5 : ¬tv on← power failure, r6 : power failure←
}
.
The single answer set of P = (P1, P2) is, as desired,
S = {power failure,¬tv on, sleep, night},
since the only answer set of P✁ is given by
S′ =
{
power failure2, power failure1, power failure,
¬tv on2,¬tv on1,¬tv on, rej (r3), sleep1, sleep, night1, night
}
.
If new information arrives in form of the program P3:
P3 =
{
r7 : ¬power failure←
}
,
then the update sequence (P1, P2, P3) has the answer set
T =
{
¬power failure, tv on,watch tv, night
}
,
generated by the following answer set T ′ of P1 ✁ P2 ✁ P3:
T ′ =
{
¬power failure3,¬power failure2,¬power failure1,¬power failure,
rej (r6), tv on1, tv on,watch tv1,watch tv, night1, night
}
.
3.2 Properties and Characterizations
Next, we discuss some properties of our approach. The first result guarantees that
answer sets of P are uniquely determined by the answer sets of P✁.
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Theorem 2
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an update sequence over a set of atoms A, and let S, T ⊆
LitA∗ be answer sets of P✁. Then, S ∩ LitA = T ∩ LitA only if S = T .
Proof
See Appendix A.1.
In view of this result, the following notation is well-defined.
Definition 4
Let P be an update sequence over A, and let S be an answer set of P. Then, Sˇ
denotes the (uniquely determined) answer set of P✁ obeying S = Sˇ ∩ LitA.
If an update sequence P consists of a single program P1, the update answer sets
of P coincide with the regular answer sets of P1.
Theorem 3
Let P be an update sequence consisting of a single program P1, i.e., P = P1. Then,
U(P) = S(P1).
Proof
This follows at once from the observation that the only difference between P1 and
P✁ is that each rule r = L ← B(r) occurring in P1 is replaced by the two rules
L1 ← B(r), not rej (r) and L ← L1. Since there are no rules in P✁ having head
literal rej (r), it holds that, for each set S of literals, r is defeated by S exactly if
L1 ← B(r), not rej (r) is defeated by S.
Answer sets of update sequences can also be characterized in a purely declarative
way. To this end, we introduce the concept of a rejection set. Let us call two rules
r1 and r2 conflicting iff H(r1) = ¬H(r2). For an update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn)
over a set of atoms A and S ⊆ LitA, based on the principle of founded rule rejection,
we define the rejection set of S by Rej (S,P) =
⋃n
i=1Rej i(S,P), where Rejn(S,P) =
∅, and, for n > i ≥ 1,
Rej i(S,P) =
{
r ∈ Pi | ∃r′ ∈ Pj \ Rej j(S,P), for some j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n},
such that r, r′ are conflicting and S |= B(r) ∪B(r′)
}
.
That is, Rej (S,P) contains those rules from P which are rejected on the basis of
rules which are not rejected themselves.
The next lemma ensures that the rejection set Rej (S,P) precisely matches the
intended meaning of the control atoms rej (·).
Lemma 1
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an update sequence over a set of atoms A, let S be an
answer set of P, and let Sˇ be the corresponding answer set of P✁. Then, r ∈
Rej (S,P) iff rej (r) ∈ Sˇ.
Proof
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We show by induction on j (0 ≤ j < n) that r ∈ Rejn−j(S,P) iff rej (r) ∈ Sˇ,
whenever r ∈ Pn−j .
Induction Base. Assume j = 0. Then the statement holds trivially because
Rejn(S,P) = ∅ and rej (r) /∈ Sˇ for all r ∈ Pn.
Induction Step. Assume n > j > 0, and let the statement hold for all k <
j. We show the assertion for k = j. Consider some r ∈ Pn−j and suppose r ∈
Rejn−j(S,P). We show rej (r) ∈ Sˇ. According to the definition of Rejn−j(S,P),
there is some r′ ∈ Pn−k \ Rejn−k(S,P), 0 ≤ k < j, such that H(r
′) = ¬H(r),
B+(r) ∪ B+(r′) ⊆ S, and both r and r′ are not defeated by S. The rule r ∈
Pn−j induces the rule rej (r) ← B(r),¬Ln−j+1 ∈ P✁, where L = H(r). From
the properties above, we have rej (r) ← B+(r),¬Ln−j+1 ∈ (P✁)Sˇ . Now, since
B+(r) ⊆ S ⊆ Sˇ, in order to show rej (r) ∈ Sˇ it suffices to show that ¬Ln−j+1 ∈ Sˇ.
This can be seen as follows. First of all, the rule r′ ∈ Pn−k induces the rule L′n−k ←
B(r), not rej (r′) ∈ P✁, where L′ = H(r′). Since H(r′) = ¬H(r), we actually have
¬Ln−k ← B(r), not rej (r′) ∈ P✁. Now, given that r′ /∈ Rejn−k(S,P), and since k <
j, by induction hypothesis we have rej (r) /∈ Sˇ. Furthermore, B−(r′)∩S = ∅ implies
¬Ln−k ← B+(r′) ∈ (P✁)Sˇ . Given that B+(r′) ⊆ S ⊆ Sˇ, we obtain ¬Ln−k ∈ Sˇ.
By observing that n − j + 1 ≤ n − k (since k < j), and given the inertia rules
¬Lm ← ¬Lm+1 ∈ (P✁)Sˇ (1 ≤ m < n), we eventually obtain Ln−j+1 ∈ Sˇ. This
proves rej (r) ∈ Sˇ.
Conversely, assume rej (r) ∈ Sˇ. We show r ∈ Rejn−j(S,P). By construction of
the update program P✁, the atom rej (r) can only be derived by means of the rule
rej (r) ← B(r),¬Ln−j+1 ∈ P✁. So, it must hold that B
+(r) ⊆ S, ¬Ln−j+1 ∈ Sˇ,
and B−(r) ∩ S = ∅. Moreover, since ¬Ln−j+1 ∈ Sˇ, there must be some r′ ∈ Pn−k,
k < j, such that ¬Ln−k ← B(r′), not rej (r′) ∈ P✁, B+(r′) ⊆ S, B−(r′) ∩ S = ∅,
and rej (r′) /∈ Sˇ. By induction hypothesis, the latter fact implies r′ /∈ Rejn−k(S,P).
So, we have that there is some r′ ∈ Pn−k \Rejn−k(S,P), k < j, such that H(r
′) =
¬H(r), B+(r) ∪B+(r′) ⊆ S, and both r and r′ are not defeated by S. This means
that r ∈ Rejn−j(S,P).
It turns out that update answer sets can be characterized in terms of a modified
Gelfond-Lifschitz reduction, by taking the elements of the respective rejection sets
into account. In what follows, for a given update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn), we
write ∪P to denote the set of all rules occurring in P, i.e., ∪P =
⋃n
i=1 Pi.
Theorem 4
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an update sequence over a set of atoms A and S ⊆ LitA
a set of literals. Then, S is an answer set of P iff S is the minimal model of
(∪P \ Rej (S,P))S .
Proof
See Appendix A.2.
Update answer sets can also be described using a weaker notion of rejection sets.
For P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over A and S ⊆ LitA, let us define
Rej ′(S,P) =
⋃n
i=1{ r ∈ Pi | ∃r
′ ∈ Pj , for some j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}, such that
r and r′ are conflicting and S |= B(r) ∪B(r′) }.
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Obviously, Rej (S,P) ⊆ Rej ′(S,P) always holds. Moreover, we get the following
variant of Theorem 4:
Theorem 5
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an update sequence over a set of atoms A and S ⊆
LitA a set of literals. Then, S is an answer set of P iff S is a minimal model of
(∪P \ Rej ′(S,P))S .
Proof
Only-if part. Suppose S is an answer set of ∪P \ Rej (S,P). Since Rej (S,P) ⊆
Rej ′(S,P), it holds that (∪P \ Rej ′(S,P)) ⊆ (∪P \ Rej (S,P)). Observe that for
each r ∈ Rej ′(S,P)\Rej (S,P) there is some r′ ∈ Rej (S,P) such that H(r) = H(r′)
and S |= B(r) ∪ B(r′). We use the following property: Let S′ be an answer set of
some program P , and let r, r′ ∈ P such that H(r) = H(r′) and S |= B(r) ∪ B(r′).
Then, S′ is an answer set of P \ {r′}. By repeated applications of this property we
get that S is an answer set of ∪P \ Rej ′(S,P).
If part. Suppose that S is a minimal model of (∪P\Rej ′(S,P))S , but there is some
r ∈ (∪P \ Rej (S,P)) \ (∪P \ Rej ′(S,P)) such that S |= B(r) and H(r) /∈ S. It
follows that r ∈ Rej ′(S,P) \ Rej (S,P).
Define Qi = {r′ ∈ Pi | H(r′) ∈ {H(r),¬H(r)} and S |= B(r′)} and let r′ ∈ Qk,
where k = max{i | r′ ∈ Qi} 6= 0. Then, r′ /∈ Rej
′(S,P). Since H(r) /∈ S, it
follows that H(r′) = ¬H(r). Furthermore, r′ /∈ Rej ′(S,P) implies r′ /∈ Rej (S,P).
Therefore, it follows that r /∈ Rej (S,P), a contradiction. We obtain that S is a
model of (∪P\Rej (S,P))S . Moreover, since (∪P\Rej ′(S,P))S ⊆ (∪P\Rej (S,P))S ,
S must be a minimal model of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S .
We make use of this alternative version of Rej (·, ·) in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
It is important to emphasize that in our approach, the update program P✁ is
not the result of the update intended to be the new knowledge state of the agent,
but it represents the semantic result of the information that a sequence of updates
P2, . . . , Pn has occurred to a knowledge base P1. Compiling the result of updates
into a single logic program in the original language (having the desired answer sets)
would mean losing history information about the update sequence. Instead, the
formalism results in a program over an extended set of atoms, which expresses at
the object level meta-concepts determining applicability of rules and computation
of those intended answer sets. In some sense, the result is therefore a declarative
specification of how rules of the original logic program and of subsequent updates
should be applied, expressed in the language of logic programs themselves.
4 Principles of Program Updates
In this section, we discuss several kinds of postulates which have been advocated in
the literature on belief change and examine to what extent update sequences satisfy
these principles. This issue has not been addressed extensively in previous work. We
first consider update programs from the perspective of belief revision and assess the
relevant postulates from this area. Afterwards, we briefly analyze further properties,
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like viewing update programs as nonmonotonic consequence operators and other
general principles. We remark that our analysis applies, in slightly adapted form,
to dynamic logic programming as well (cf. Section 7.3).
4.1 Belief Revision
Following Ga¨rdenfors and Rott (1995), two different approaches to belief revision
can be distinguished: (i) immediate revision, where the new information is simply
added to the current stock of beliefs and the belief change is accomplished by the
semantics of the underlying (often, nonmonotonic) logic; and (ii) logic-constrained
revision, where the new stock of beliefs is determined by a nontrivial operation
which adds and retracts beliefs, respecting logical inference and some constraints.
In the latter approach, it is assumed that beliefs are sentences from a given logical
language LB, closed under the standard boolean connectives. A belief set, K, is a
subset of LB which is closed under a consequence operator Cn(·) of the underlying
logic. A belief base for K is a subset B ⊆ K such that K = Cn(B). A belief base is a
special case of epistemic state (Darwiche & Pearl, 1997), which is a set of sentences
E representing an associated belief set K in terms of a mapping Bel(·) such that
K = Bel(E), where E need not necessarily have the same language as K.
In what follows, we first introduce different classes of postulates, and then we
examine them with respect to update sequences.
4.1.1 AGM Postulates
One of the main aims of logic-constrained revision is to characterize suitable revision
operators through postulates. In the AGM approach (after Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors,
and Makinson (1985)), three basic operations on a belief set K are considered:
• expansion K + φ, which is simply adding the new information φ ∈ LB to K;
• revision K ⋆ φ, which is sensibly revising K in the light of φ (in particular,
when K contradicts φ); and
• contraction K − φ, which is removing φ from K.
AGM proposes a set of postulates, K⋆1–K⋆8, that any revision operator ⋆ map-
ping a belief set K ⊆ LB and a sentence φ ∈ LB into the revised belief set K ⋆ φ
should satisfy. If, following both Darwiche and Pearl (1997) and Brewka (2000), we
assume thatK is represented by an epistemic state E, then the postulates K⋆1–K⋆8
can be reformulated as follows:
(K1) E ⋆ φ represents a belief set.
(K2) φ ∈ Bel(E ⋆ φ).
(K3) Bel(E ⋆ φ) ⊆ Bel(E + φ).
(K4) ¬φ /∈ Bel (E) implies Bel(E + φ) ⊆ Bel (E ⋆ φ).
(K5) ⊥ ∈ Bel(E ⋆ φ) only if φ is unsatisfiable.
(K6) φ1 ≡ φ2 implies Bel(E ⋆ φ1) = Bel (E ⋆ φ2).
(K7) Bel(E ⋆ (φ ∧ ψ)) ⊆ Bel ((E ⋆ φ) + ψ).
(K8) ¬ψ /∈ Bel(E ⋆ φ) implies Bel ((E ⋆ φ) + ψ) ⊆ Bel(E ⋆ (φ ∧ ψ)).
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Here, E ⋆ φ and E + φ is the revision and expansion operation, respectively,
applied to E. Informally, these postulates express that the new information should
be reflected after the revision, and that the belief set should change as little as
possible. As has been pointed out, this set of postulates is appropriate for new
information about an unchanged world, but not for incorporation of a change to
the actual world. Such a mechanism is addressed by the next set of postulates,
expressing update operations.
4.1.2 Update Postulates
For update operators B ⋄ φ realizing a change φ to a belief base B, Katsuno and
Mendelzon (1991) proposed a set of postulates, U⋄1–U⋄8, where both φ and B
are propositional sentences over a finitary language. For epistemic states E, these
postulates can be reformulated as follows.
(U1) φ ∈ Bel (E ⋄ φ).
(U2) φ ∈ Bel (E) implies Bel(E ⋄ φ) = Bel(E).
(U3) If Bel(E) is consistent and φ is satisfiable, then Bel(E ⋄ φ) is consistent.
(U4) If Bel(E) = Bel (E′) and φ ≡ ψ, then Bel(E ⋄ φ) = Bel(E ⋄ ψ).
(U5) Bel(E ⋄ (φ ∧ ψ)) ⊆ Bel((E ⋄ φ) + ψ).
(U6) If φ ∈ Bel(E ⋄ ψ) and ψ ∈ Bel(E ⋄ φ), then Bel (E ⋄ φ) = Bel (E ⋄ ψ).
(U7) If Bel(E) is complete, then Bel(E ⋄ (ψ ∨ ψ′)) ⊆ Bel(E ⋄ ψ) ∧ Bel(E ⋄ ψ′)).3
(U8) Bel((E ∨ E′) ⋄ ψ) = Bel((E ⋄ ψ) ∨ (E′ ⋄ ψ).
Here, conjunction and disjunction of epistemic states are presumed to be definable
in the given language (e.g., in terms of intersection and union of associated sets of
models, respectively).
The most important differences between (K1)–(K8) and (U1)–(U8) are that re-
vision should yield the same result as expansion E + φ, providing φ is compatible
with E, which is not desirable for update in general, cf. (Winslett, 1988). On the
other hand, (U8) says that if E can be decomposed into a disjunction of states (e.g.,
models), then each case can be updated separately and the overall result is formed
by taking the disjunction of the emerging states.
4.1.3 Iterated Revision
Darwiche and Pearl (1997) have proposed postulates for iterated revision, which can
be rephrased in our setting as follows (we omit parentheses in sequences (E⋆φ1)⋆φ2
of revisions):
(C1) If ψ2 ∈ Bel(ψ1), then Bel(E ⋆ ψ2 ⋆ ψ1) = Bel (E ⋆ ψ1).
(C2) If ¬ψ2 ∈ Bel (ψ1), then Bel (E ⋆ ψ1 ⋆ ψ2) = Bel(E ⋆ ψ2).
(C3) If ψ2 ∈ Bel(E ⋆ ψ1), then ψ2 ∈ Bel (E ⋆ ψ2 ⋆ ψ1).
(C4) If ¬ψ2 /∈ Bel (E ⋆ ψ1), then ¬ψ2 /∈ Bel(E ⋆ ψ2 ⋆ ψ1).
3 A belief set K is complete iff, for each atom A, either A ∈ K or ¬A ∈ K.
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(C5) If ¬ψ2 ∈ Bel (E ⋆ ψ1) and ψ1 /∈ Bel(E ⋆ ψ2), then ψ1 /∈ Bel (E ⋆ ψ1 ⋆ ψ2).
(C6) If ¬ψ2 ∈ Bel (E ⋆ ψ1) and ¬ψ1 ∈ Bel (E ⋆ ψ2), then ¬ψ1 ∈ Bel(E ⋆ ψ1 ⋆ ψ2).
Another set of postulates for iterated revision, corresponding to a sequence E
of observations, has been formulated by Lehmann (1995). Here, each observation
is a sentence which is assumed to be consistent (i.e., falsity is not observed), and
the epistemic state E has an associated belief set Bel(E). Lehmann’s postulates
read as follows, where E,E′ denote sequences of observations and “,” stands for
concatenation:
(I1) Bel (E) is a consistent belief set.
(I2) φ ∈ Bel (E, φ).
(I3) If ψ ∈ Bel(E, φ), then φ⇒ ψ ∈ Bel (E).
(I4) If φ ∈ Bel (E), then Bel (E, φ,E′) = Bel(E,E).
(I5) If ψ ⊢ φ then Bel (E, φ, ψ,E′) = Bel(E,ψ,E′).
(I6) If ¬ψ /∈ Bel (E, φ), then Bel (E, φ, ψ,E′) = Bel(E, φ, ψ,E′).
(I7) Bel (E,¬φ, φ) ⊆ Cn(E + φ).
4.1.4 Analysis of the Postulates
In order to evaluate the different postulates, we need to adapt them for the setting
of update programs. Naturally, the epistemic state P = (P1, . . . , Pn) of an agent
is subject to revision. However, the associated belief set Bel(P) (⊆ LA) does not
belong to a logical language closed under boolean connectives. Closing LA under
conjunction does not cause much troubles, as the identification of finite logic pro-
grams with finite conjunctions of clauses permits that updates of a logic program
P by a program P ′ can be viewed as the update of P with a single sentence from
the underlying belief language. Ambiguities arise, however, with the interpretation
of expansion, as well as with the meaning of negation and disjunction of rules and
programs, respectively.
Depending on whether the particular structure of the epistemic state E should
be respected, different definitions of expansion are imaginable in our framework.
At the “extensional” level of sentences, represented by a program or sequence of
programs P, Bel (P+P ′) is defined as Bel(Bel (P)∪P ′). At the “intensional” level
of sequences P = (P1, . . . , Pn), Bel(P+P
′) could be defined as Bel (P1, . . . , Pn∪P ′).
An intermediate approach would be defining Bel (P + P ′) = BelA(P✁ ∪ P ′). We
adopt the extensional view here. Note that, in general, adding P ′ to Bel(P) does
not amount to the semantical intersection of P ′ and Bel(P) (nor of ∪P and P ′,
respectively).
As for negation, we might interpret the condition ¬φ /∈ Bel(E) (or ¬ψ /∈ Bel (E ⋆
φ) in (K4) and (K8)) as satisfiability requirement for E+φ (or (E ⋆φ)+ψ, respec-
tively).
Disjunction ∨ of rules or programs (as epistemic states) appears to be meaningful
only at the semantical level. The union S(P1)∪S(P2) of the answer sets of programs
P1 and P2 may be represented syntactically through a program P3, which in general
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Table 1. Interpretation of Postulates (K1 )–(K8 ) and (U1 )–(U6 ).
Postulate Interpretation Postulate holds
(K1) (P, P ) represents a belief set yes
(K2), (U1) P ⊆ Bel((P, P )) yes
(U2) Bel(P ) ⊆ Bel(P) implies Bel((P, P )) = Bel(P) no
(K3) Bel((P, P )) ⊆ Bel(Bel(P) ∪ P ) yesa
(U3) If P and P are satisfiable, then (P, P ) is satisfiable no
(K4) If Bel(P) ∪ P has an answer set, then no
Bel(Bel(P) ∪ P ) ⊆ Bel((P, P ))
(K5) (P, P ) is unsatisfiable only if P is unsatisfiable no
(K6), (U4) P ≡ P′ and P ≡ P ′ implies (P, P ) ≡ (P′, P ′) no
(K7), (U5) Bel((P, P ∪ P ′)) ⊆ Bel(Bel((P, P )) ∪ P ′) yesb
(U6) Bel(P ′) ⊆ Bel((P, P )) and Bel(P ) ⊆ Bel((P, P ′)) no
implies Bel((P, P )) = Bel((P, P ′))
(K8) If Bel((P, P )) ∪ P ′ is satisfiable, then no
Bel(Bel((P, P )) ∪ P ′) ⊆ Bel((P, P ∪ P ′))
a If either P or P has a finite alphabet.
b If either (∪P) ∪ P or P ′ has a finite alphabet.
requests an extended set of atoms. We thus do not consider the postulates involving
the operator ∨.
Given these considerations, Table 1 summarizes our interpretation of postulates
(K1)–(K8) and (U1)–(U6), and includes references whether the respective prop-
erty holds or fails. We assume that P,P′ are sequences of ELPs, and P, P ′ denote
single ELPs. Moreover, the notation (P, P ) is an abbreviation for the sequence
(P1, . . . , Pn, P ) if P = (P1, . . . , Pn). Demonstrations and counterexamples concern-
ing these properties are given in Appendix A.3, and can be easily adapted for
dynamic logic programming too.
As can be seen from Table 1, apart from very simple postulates, the majority of
the adapted AGM and update postulates are violated by update programs. This
holds even for the case where P is a single program. In particular, Bel((P, P ))
violates discriminating postulates such as (U2) for update and (K4) for revision. In
the light of this, update programs neither have update nor revision flavor.
We remark that the picture does not change if we abandon extensional expansion
and consider the postulates under intensional expansion. Thus, also under this view,
update programs do not satisfy minimality of change.
The postulates (C1)–(C6) and (I1)–(I7) for iterated revision are treated in Ta-
ble 2; proofs of these properties can be found in Appendix A.4. Observe that
Lehmann’s postulate (I3) is considered as the pendant to AGM postulate K⋆3.
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Table 2. Interpretation of Postulates (C1 )–(C6 ) and (I1 )–(I6 ).
Postulate Interpretation Postulate holds
(C1) If P ′ ⊆ Bel(P ), then Bel((P, P ′, P )) = Bel((P, P )) no
(C2) If S 6|= P ′, for all S ∈ S(P ), then no
Bel((P, P, P ′)) = Bel((P, P ′))
(C3) If P ′ ⊆ Bel((P, P )), then P ′ ⊆ Bel((P, P ′, P )) no
(C4) If S |= P ′ for some S ∈ U((P, P )), then yes
S |= P ′ for some S ∈ U((P, P ′, P ))
(C5) If S 6|= P ′ for all S ∈ U((P, P )) and P 6⊆ Bel((P, P ′)), no
then P 6⊆ Bel((P, P, P ′))
(C6) If S 6|= P ′ for all S ∈ U((P, P )) and S 6|= P for all no
S ∈ U((P, P ′)), then S 6|= P for all S ∈ U((P, P, P ′))
(I1) Bel(P) is a consistent belief set no
(I2) P ⊆ Bel((P, P )) yes
(I3) If L0 ← ∈ Bel((P, {L1 ← , . . . , Lk ← })), then yes
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lk ∈ Bel(P)
(I4) If Q1 ⊆ Bel(P), then no
Bel((P, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn)) = Bel((P, Q2, . . . , Qn))
(I5) If Bel(Q2) ⊆ Bel(Q1), then no
Bel((P, Q1, Q2, Q3, . . . , Qn))=Bel((P, Q2, Q3, . . . , Qn))
(I6) If S |= Q2 for some S ∈ U((P, Q1)), then no
Bel((P, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn)) = Bel((P, Q1, Q1 ∪Q2, Q3,. . . , Qn))
In a literal interpretation of (I3), since the belief language associated with logic
programs does not have implication, we may consider the case where ψ is a default
literal L0 and φ = L1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lk is a conjunction of literals Li, such that φ ⇒ ψ
corresponds to the rule L0 ← L1, . . . , Lk. Moreover, since the negation of logic
programs is not defined, we do not interpret (I7).
Note that, although postulate (C3) fails in general, it holds if P ′ contains a single
rule. Thus, all of the above postulates except (C4) fail, and, with the exception of
(C3), each change is given by a single rule.
We can view the epistemic state P = (P1, . . . , Pn) of an agent as a prioritized
belief base in the spirit of (Brewka, 1991b; Nebel, 1991; Benferhat et al., 1993).
Revision with a new piece of information Q is accomplished by simply changing
the epistemic state to P′ = (P1, . . . , Pn, Q). The change of the belief base is then
automatically accomplished by the nonmonotonic semantics of a sequence of logic
programs. Under this view, updating logic programs amounts to an instance of the
immediate revision approach.
On the other hand, referring to the update program, we may view the belief
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set of the agent represented through a pair 〈P,A〉 of a logic program P and a
(fixed) set of atoms A, such that its belief set is given by BelA(P ). Under this
view, a new piece of information Q is incorporated into the belief set by producing
a representation, 〈P ′,A〉, of the new belief set, where P ′ = P ✁Q. Here, (a set of)
sentences from an extended belief language is used to characterize the new belief
set, which is constructed by a non-trivial operation employing the semantics of logic
programs. Thus, update programs enjoy to some extent also a logic-constrained
revision flavor. Nonetheless, as also the failure of postulates shows, they are more
an instance of immediate than logic-constrained revision. What we naturally expect,
though, is that the two views described above amount to the same at a technical
level. However, as we shall demonstrate below, this is not true in general.
4.2 Update Programs as Nonmonotonic Consequence Relations
Following Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (1991; 1994), belief revision can be related to
nonmonotonic reasoning by interpreting it as an abstract consequence relation on
sentences, where the epistemic state is fixed. In the same way, we can interpret
update programs as abstract consequence relation on programs as follows. For a
fixed epistemic state P and logic programs P1 and P2, we define
P1 ∼P P2 if and only if P2 ⊆ Bel(P, P1),
i.e., if the rules P2 are in the belief set of the agent after update of the epistemic
state with P1.
Various postulates for nonmonotonic inference operations have been identified
in the literature. In what follows, we consider some sets of postulates and discuss
their interpretations in terms of update programs. First of all, we review principles
discussed by Makinson (1993), who considered a set of (desirable) properties for
nonmonotonic reasoning, and analyzed the behavior of some reasoning formalisms
with respect to these properties. Afterwards, we consider postulates proposed by
Lehmann and Magidor (1992), which deal with properties of so-called preferen-
tial consequence relations. It is argued that such properties are necessary but not
sufficient for a preferential consequence relation to be meaningful and useful in
reasoning. As we will see, updates fail also in satisfying the essential properties.
Although our analysis is based on the specific semantics expressed by the trans-
formation of Definition 2, arguably it holds for other update formalisms as well.
In fact, quite the same pattern can be found for dynamic logic programs (Alferes
et al., 2000), because, with few exceptions, all proofs and counterexamples hold
for this formalism too (dynamic logic programming will be discussed in detail in
Section 7.3). Thus, intuitively, the failure of some basic principles of nonmonotonic
reasoning in the context of updates stems from the same nature of update semantics
based on rule rejection, and not on the particular transformation chosen.
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4.2.1 General Patterns of Nonmonotonic Inference Relations
Gabbay (1985) was the first to propose the idea that the output of nonmono-
tonic systems should be considered as an abstract consequence relation, in order
to get a clearer understanding of the diverse nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms.
Ensuing research identified several important principles, based on both syntactic
and model-theoretic considerations. Among the different properties analyzed by
Makinson (1993), the following principles are amenable for logic programs under
the standard Gelfond-Lifschitz approach, and can thus be formulated for update
programs as well:
(N1) P1 ∼P P1.
(N2) If P1 ∼P Q1 ∧ . . . ∧Qm and P1 ∧Q1 ∧ . . . ∧Qm ∼P P2, then P1 ∼P P2.
(N3) If P1 ∼P Q1 ∧ . . . ∧Qm and P1 ∼P P2, then P1 ∧Q1 ∧ . . . ∧Qm ∼P P2.
(N4) If P1 ∼P P2, P2 ∼P P3, . . . , Pn ∼P P1 (n ≥ 2), then {P ′ | Pi ∼P P ′} =
{P ′ | Pj ∼P P ′}, for all i, j ≤ n.
Postulate (N1) is called Inclusion and coincides with (K2) and (U1). Properties
(N2) and (N3) are important nonmonotonic inference principles and are respec-
tively called Cut and Cautious Monotony. Inference relations which obey both of
these properties are said to be cumulative. It is well-known that most nonmonotonic
formalisms are not cumulative, and several variants of standard nonmonotonic ap-
proaches have been defined in order to satisfy cumulativity (e.g., (Brewka, 1991a;
Schaub, 1991)). The last principle, (N4), is called Loop and was first formulated and
studied by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor (1990) as a property of inference rela-
tions generated by preferential model structures. Roughly speaking, Loop expresses
a syntactic counterpart of transitivity on the model structure.
Other properties, additionally studied by Makinson (1993), which cannot be in-
terpreted for logic programs include Supraclassicality, Absorption, Distribution, and
Consistency Preservation. We refer the reader to (Makinson, 1993) for more infor-
mation on these principles.
4.2.2 Properties of Updates as a Preferential Relation
Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor (1990) defined preferential consequence relations as
binary relations ∼ over propositional formulas satisfying the following properties
(here, “|=” denotes validity in classical propositional logic):
(P1) If |= (φ⇔ ψ) and φ ∼ γ, then ψ ∼ γ.
(P2) If |= (φ⇒ ψ) and γ ∼ φ, then γ ∼ ψ.
(P3) φ ∼ φ.
(P4) If φ ∼ ψ and φ ∼ γ, then φ ∼ ψ ∧ γ.
(P5) If φ ∼ γ and ψ ∼ γ, then (φ ∨ ψ) ∼ γ.
(P6) If φ ∼ ψ and φ ∼ γ, then (φ ∧ ψ) ∼ γ.
Rule (P1) is called Left Logical Equivalence and (P2) is the principle of Right Weak-
ening. Property (P3) coincides with (N1) and is referred to by Kraus, Lehmann,
20 T. Eiter et al.
and Magidor as Reflexivity. (P4) and (P5) are respectively called And and Or. The
last rule, (P6), is identical with (N3), the principle of Cautious Monotony.
As noted by the above authors, any assertional relation satisfying (P1)–(P6) also
satisfies Cut, expressed here as the following rule:
If φ ∧ ψ ∼ γ and φ ∼ ψ, then φ ∼ γ.
Since not all preferential relations can be considered as reasonable inference pro-
cedures, Lehmann and Magidor (1992) subsequently defined a more restricted class
of preferential relations, called rational consequence relations. They show that such
rational consequence relations give rise to logical closure operations which satisfy
the principle of cumulativity. Since none of the postulates for rational relations can
be formulated for logic programs, they are not discussed here.
4.2.3 Analysis
The interpretation of postulates (N1)–(N4) in terms of update sequences is given
in Table 3. The results show that (N1) and (N2) hold, whereas (N3) and (N4) fail.
This corresponds to the situation of standard logic programs under the answer set
semantics. Hence, in some sense, updates do not represent a loss in properties with
respect to standard answer set semantics.
Table 3 contains also the interpretation of postulates (P1)–(P6). As a matter
of fact, since (P3) and (P6) coincide with (N1) and (N3), respectively, and (P5)
admits no interpretation in terms of logic programs, only postulates (P1), (P2),
and (P4) are included in Table 3. Like the failure of (K6) and (U4), the failure of
postulate (P1) showcases the syntax-dependency of update programs, as equivalent
programs do not behave the same way under identical update information. Proofs
and counterexamples for properties (N1)–(N4), (P1), (P2), and (P4) are given in
Appendix A.5.
4.3 Further Properties
Rounding off our discussion on principles of update sequences, we describe some
additional general properties which, as we believe, updates and sequences of up-
dates should satisfy. The given properties are not developed in a systematic manner,
though, and they are not meant to represent an exhaustive list. Unless stated oth-
erwise, update programs enjoy these properties.
Addition of Tautologies : If the program Q contains only tautological rules (i.e., if
Q contains only rules of the form L← L), then (P, Q) ≡ P.
This property is violated, which is also the case e.g. for dynamic logic programs.
Consider the programs P1 = {a ← }, P2 = {¬a ← }, and P3 = {a ← a}. Then
(P1, P2) has the single answer set {¬a}. By updating with P3, the interaction be-
tween P1 and P3 generates another answer set for (P1, P2, P3), namely {a}. Note,
however, that tautological rules in updates are, as we believe, rare in practical
applications and can be eliminated easily.
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Table 3. Interpretation of Postulates (N1 )–(N4 ), (P1 ), (P2 ), and (P4 ).
Postulate Interpretation Postulate holds
(N1) P1 ∈ Bel((P, P1)) yes
(N2) If
⋃m
i=1
Qi ⊆ Bel((P, P1)) and yes
P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1 ∪
⋃m
i=1
Q1)), then P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1))
(N3) If
⋃m
i=1
Qi ⊆ Bel((P, P1)) and P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1)), then no
P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1 ∪
⋃m
i=1
Q1))
(N4) If Pi+1 ⊆ Bel((P, Pi)) (1 ≤ i < n) and no
P1 ⊆ Bel((P, Pn)) (n ≥ 2), then
{P ′ | P ′ ⊆ Bel((P, Pi))} = {P
′ | P ′ ⊆ Bel((P, Pj))},
for all i, j ≤ n
(P1) If P1 ≡ P2 and P3 ⊆ Bel((P, P1)), then no
P3 ⊆ Bel((P, P2))
(P2) If P1 |= P2 and P1 ⊆ Bel((P, P3)), then no
P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P3))
(P4) If P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1)) and P3 ⊆ Bel((P, P1)), then yes
P2 ∪ P3 ⊆ Bel((P, P1))
Initialization: (∅, P ) ≡ P .
This property states that the update of an initial empty knowledge base yields just
the update itself.
Idempotence: (P, P ) ≡ P .
Updating program P by itself has no effect. This property is in fact a special case
of the following principle:
Absorption: (P, Q,Q) ≡ (P, Q).
The next three properties express conditions involving programs over disjoint
alphabets.
Update of Disjoint Programs : If P = P1 ∪ P2 is the union of programs P1, P2 on
disjoint alphabets A1 and A2, then P ✁Q ≡A1∪A2 (P1 ✁Q) ∪ (P2 ✁Q).
Parallel Updates : If P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is an update sequence over A, and Q1 and
Q2 are programs defined over disjoint alphabets A1 and A2, respectively, then
P1✁ · · ·✁Pn✁ (Q1∪Q2) ≡A∪A1∪A2 (P1✁ · · ·✁Pn✁Q1)∪ (P1✁ · · ·✁Pn✁Q2).
In other words, the update by non-interfering programs can be done in parallel,
by merging the respective results. This property is not satisfied: Consider the case
n = 1, with P1 = P and Q2 = ∅. Assuming that the property holds, we would have
Bel(P ✁Q1) = Bel ((P ✁Q1)∪P ), i.e., P holds in (P,Q1) no matter what. This is
quite obviously not the case.
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Noninterference: If P1 and P2 are programs defined over disjoint alphabets, then
(P, P1, P2) ≡ (P, P2, P1).
That is, the order of updates which do not interfere with each other is immaterial.
This property is an immediate consequence of the following stronger property:
SupposeQ ⊆ P2 is a program such that there are no rules r ∈ Q and r′ ∈ (P2\Q)∪P1
with H(r) = ¬H(r′). Then, (P, P1, P2) ≡ (P, P1 ∪Q,P2 \Q).
Augmented Update: If P1 ⊆ P2, then (P, P1, P2) ≡ (P, P2).
Updating with additional rules makes the previous update obsolete. This property
is a somewhat stronger, syntactic variant of the postulate (C1) from above, which
fails. On the other hand, it includes Absorption as a special case.
Note that (P, P2, P1) ≡ (P, P2) does in general not hold, which may be desired
in some cases: Omission of a rule r in P2 with respect to P1 leaves the possibility
to violate r.
As mentioned before, a sequence of updatesP = (P1, . . . , Pn) can be viewed either
from the point of view of “immediate” revision, or as “logic-constrained” revision.
The following property, which deserves particular attention, expresses equivalence
of these views (the property is formulated for the case n = 3):
Iterativity: For any epistemic state P1 and ELPs P2 and P3 over A, it holds that
P1 ✁ P2 ✁ P3 ≡A (P1 ✁ P2)✁ P3.
However, this property fails. Informally, soundness of this property would mean that
a sequence of three updates is a shorthand for iterated update of a single program,
i.e., the result of P1 ✁ P2 is viewed as a singleton sequence. Stated another way,
this property would mean that the definition for P1 ✁ P2 ✁ P3 can be viewed as
a shorthand for the nested case. Vice versa, this property reads as possibility to
forget an update once and for all, by incorporating it immediately into the current
belief set.
For a concrete counterexample, consider P1 = ∅, P2 = {a ←, ¬a ← }, and
P3 = {a← }. The program P✁ = P1✁P2✁P3 has a unique answer set, in which a
is true. On the other hand, (P1✁P2)✁P3 has no consistent answer set. Informally,
while the “local” inconsistency of P2 is removed in P1 ✁ P2 ✁ P3 by rejection of
the rule ¬a ← via P3, a similar rejection in (P1 ✁ P2)✁ P3 is blocked because of
a renaming of the predicates in P1 ✁ P2. The local inconsistency of P2 is thus not
eliminated.
However, under certain conditions, which exclude such possibilities for local in-
consistencies, the iterativity property holds, given by the following result:
Theorem 6
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1, . . . , Pn), n > m ≥ 2 be a sequence of programs over a
set of atoms A. Suppose that for any conflicting rules r1, r2 ∈ Pi, i ≤ m, one of the
following conditions holds:
(i) There is some rule r ∈ Pj , i < j ≤ m, such that either H(r) = H(r1) and
B(r) ⊆ B(r1), or H(r) = H(r2) and B(r) ⊆ B(r2);
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(ii) there are rules r′1, r
′
2 ∈ Pj , m < j ≤ n, such that H(rk) = H(r
′
k) and
B(r′k) ⊆ B(rk), k ∈ {1, 2}, and no rule r ∈ Pj′ exists with j < j
′ ≤ n and
H(r) = H(r1) or H(r) = H(r2); or
(iii) B(r1) ∪B(r2) is unsatisfiable.
Then:
P1 ✁ · · ·✁ Pn ≡A (P1 ✁ · · ·✁ Pm)✁ Pm+1 ✁ · · ·✁ Pn.
The proof of this theorem is technically involving and is not presented here; it
can be found in (Eiter et al., 2000b). Observe that Conditions (i)–(iii) of Theorem 6
are simple syntactic criteria, which can be easily checked.
A weaker version of Theorem 6 may be applied if updates should be incorporated
instantaneously, by only considering Condition (iii). This condition can be locally
checked on each update, and is useful, e.g., if P1✁P2 has already been constructed.
Since, for any programs Q1 and Q2, the update program Q1 ✁ Q2 does not have
rules with opposite heads, we can conclude from Theorem 6 that incorporating
consecutive updates which obey assertion (iii) is equivalent to the update program
for the sequence of updates.
Theorem 7
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn), n ≥ 2, be an update sequence on a set of atoms A. Suppose
that, for any conflicting rules r1, r2 ∈ Pi, i ≤ n, the union B(r1) ∪ B(r2) of their
bodies is unsatisfiable. Then:
(· · · (P1 ✁ P2)✁ P3) · · ·✁ Pn−1)✁ Pn ≡A P1 ✁ P2 ✁ P3 ✁ · · ·✁ Pn.
In certain cases, the assertions in Theorem 6 can be dropped. One such case is a
repeated update, i.e., (P1, P2, P2); see (Eiter et al., 2000b) for more details.
5 Refined Semantics: Minimal and Strictly Minimal Answer Sets
A property which update programs intuitively do not respect is minimality of
change. In general, it is desirable to incorporate a new set of rules P2 into an
existing program P1 with as little change as possible. This, of course, requests us
to specify how similarity (or difference) between programs is understood and, fur-
thermore, how proximity of programs is measured. In particular, the question is
whether similarity should be model-based, or syntactically defined.
Since the semantics of update programs depends on syntax, a pure model-based
notion of similarity between logic programs seems less appealing for defining mini-
mality of change. A natural approach for measuring the change which P1 undergoes
by an update with P2 is by considering those rules in P1 which are abandoned. This
leads us to prefer an answer set S1 of P = (P1, P2) over another answer set S2 if
S1 satisfies a larger set of rules from P1 than S2.
Definition 5
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an update sequence. An answer set S ∈ U(P) is minimal
iff there is no S′ ∈ U(P) such that Rej (S′,P) ⊂ Rej (S,P).
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Example 2
Consider the sequence (P1, P2, P3) from Example 1. Assume that the following
additional update is received, describing that a TV can also be turned off:
P4 =
{
r8 : switched off← not tv on, not power failure;
r9 : tv on← not switched off, not power failure;
r10 : ¬tv on← switched off;
r11 : ¬switched off← tv on
}
.
While (P1, P2, P3) has the single answer set S1 = {night,¬power failure, tv on,
watch tv}, the new sequence P = (P1, P2, P3, P4) has two answer sets: S1 ∪
{¬switched off} and, additionally, S2 = {night,¬power failure, switched off,¬tv on,
sleep}. Both answer sets reject rule r6, but S2 rejects r3, too. Thus, S1 is minimal
and, corresponding to our intuition, should be preferred to S2.
Minimal answer sets put no further emphasis on the temporal order of updates.
Rules in more recent updates may be violated in order to satisfy rules from previous
updates. Eliminating this possibility leads us to the following notion:
Definition 6
Let S, S′ ∈ U(P), for some update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn). Then, S is preferred
over S′ iff some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} exists such that (i) Rej i(S, P ) ⊂ Rej i(S
′, P ), and
(ii) Rej j(S, P ) = Rej j(S
′, P ), for all j = i + 1, . . . , n. An answer set S of P is
strictly minimal, if no S′ ∈ U(P) exists which is preferred over S.
Example 3
Suppose in the previous example we had observed that the TV was off when the
power returned, i.e., replace P3 in (P1, P2, P3, P4) by:
P ′3 =
{
r7 : ¬power failure←, r
′
7 : ¬tv on←
}
.
The modified update sequence P′ = (P1, P2, P
′
3, P4) yields the same answer sets as
before:
S1 = {night,¬power failure,¬switched off, tv on,watch tv};
S2 = {night,¬power failure, switched off,¬tv on, sleep}.
However, now both answer sets are minimal: We have Rej (S1,P
′) = {r′7, r6} and
Rej (S2,P
′) = {r3, r6}. Thus, Rej (S1,P
′) and Rej (S2,P
′) are incomparable, and
hence both S1 and S2 are minimal answer sets. Since in S1 the more recent rule of
P ′3 is violated, S2 is the unique strictly minimal answer set.
We denote by Belmin(P) the set of all rules which are true in any minimal answer
set of an update sequence P. Likewise, Bel str(P) denotes the set of all rules which
are true in all strictly minimal answer sets of P.
Let us consider some further example stressing the difference between regular
update answer sets, minimal answer sets, and strictly minimal answer sets.
Example 4
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An agent consulting different sources in search of a performance or a final rehearsal
of a concert on a given weekend may be faced with the following situation. First,
the agent is notified by one of the sources that there is no concert on Friday:
P1 =
{
r1 : ¬concert friday←
}
.
Later on, a second source reports that it is neither aware of a final rehearsal on
Friday, nor of a concert on Saturday:
P2 =
{
r2 : ¬final rehearsal friday←, r3 : ¬concert saturday←
}
.
Finally, the agent is assured that there is a final rehearsal or a concert on Friday
and that whenever there is a final rehearsal on Friday, a concert on Saturday or
Sunday follows:
P3 =
{
r4 : concert friday← not final rehearsal friday;
r5 : final rehearsal friday ← not concert friday;
r6 : concert saturday← final rehearsal friday, not concert sunday;
r7 : concert sunday← final rehearsal friday, not concert saturday
}
.
The update sequence P = (P1, P2, P3) yields three answer sets:
S1 = {final rehearsal friday,¬concert friday, concert saturday};
S2 = {final rehearsal friday,¬concert friday,¬concert saturday, concert sunday};
S3 = {¬final rehearsal friday, concert friday,¬concert saturday},
The corresponding rejection sets are:
Rej (S1,P) = {r2, r3};
Rej (S2,P) = {r2};
Rej (S3,P) = {r1}.
Thus, S2 and S3 are minimal answer sets, with S3 being the single strictly minimal
answer set of P.
Clearly, every strictly minimal answer set is minimal, but not vice versa. It is
easily seen that for the case of update sequences involving only two update pro-
grams, i.e., for update sequences of the form P = (P1, P2), the notions of strictly
minimal answer sets and minimal answer sets coincide. As for the AGM postulates,
inspection shows that minimal and strictly minimal answer sets satisfy the same
postulates as regular update answer sets, with the exception that (K3) and (K4)
hold for the former ones.
Concerning the implementation of minimal and strictly minimal answer sets, in
Section 6.2 we will show how they can be characterized in terms of ELPs.
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6 Computational Issues
6.1 Complexity
In this section, we address the computational complexity of update programs. We
assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of complexity theory;
e.g., (Johnson, 1990) and (Papadimitriou, 1994) are good sources (for complexity
results in logic programming, cf. (Schlipf, 1995; Eiter & Gottlob, 1995; Dantsin
et al., 1997)). In our analysis, we focus on the case of finite, propositional update
sequences.
We briefly recall the definitions of the complexity classes relevant in the follow-
ing analysis. The class NP consists of all decision problems which are solvable in
polynomial time using a nondeterministic Turing machine, and ΣP2 is the class of
all decision problems solvable by a nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial
time with access to an oracle for problems in NP (ΣP2 is also written as NP
NP).
Furthermore, coNP refers to the class of problems whose complementary problems
are in NP, and ΠP2 contains the complements of the problems in Σ
P
2 .
4 All the men-
tioned classes belong to the polynomial hierarchy: NP and coNP are at the first
level of the hierarchy, and ΣP2 and Π
P
2 are the second level. As well, NP ⊆ Σ
P
2 and
coNP ⊆ ΠP2 . It is widely held that these inclusions are proper.
It is clear that the complexity of normal logic programs, which resides at the first
level of the polynomial hierarchy (Marek & Truszczyn´ski, 1991), is a lower bound
for the complexity of update programs. For arbitrary updates, the complexity does
not increase, even if we consider a sequence of updates.
Theorem 8
Given an update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over a set of atoms A, then:
(i) determining whether P has an answer set is NP-complete;
(ii) determining whether L ∈ Bel(P) for some literal L is coNP-complete.
Hardness holds in both cases for n = 1.
Proof
The program P✁ = P1 ✁ P2 ✁ · · · ✁ Pn can obviously be generated in polynomial
time from P = (P1, . . . , Pn). Furthermore, deciding consistency of P✁ is in NP,
and checking whether L ∈ Bel(P✁) is in coNP. This proves membership. NP-
hardness and coNP-hardness of the respective tasks is inherited from the complexity
of normal logic programs (Marek & Truszczyn´ski, 1991).
Under minimal updates, the complexity of updates increases by one level in the
polynomial hierarchy. This is no surprise, though, and parallels analogous results
on update logic programs by Sakama and Inoue (1999) as well as previous results
on updating logical theories and iterated circumscription (Eiter & Gottlob, 1992;
Eiter & Gottlob, 1995).
4 Two decision problems, D1 and D2, are complementary (or, D1 and D2 are complements of
each other) if it holds that I is a yes-instance of D1 exactly if I is a no-instance of D2.
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Theorem 9
Given an update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over a set of atoms A and some rule
r, the following two problems are ΠP2 -complete:
(i) determining whether r ∈ Belmin(P); and
(ii) determining whether r ∈ Bel str(P).
Hardness holds even if n = 2.
Proof
We first show that the two tasks are in ΠP2 . We treat only task (i); the case of
task (ii) is analogous. In order to show membership of (i) in ΠP2 , we show that the
complementary problem is in ΣP2 . To disprove r ∈ Belmin(P), we can construct
the update program P✁ = P1 ✁ P2 ✁ · · · ✁ Pn in polynomial time from P and
guess an answer set Sˇ ⊆ A∗ of P✁ such that Sˇ 6|= r and where S = Sˇ ∩ A is a
minimal answer set of P (recall that S ∈ U(P) is minimal iff there is no T ∈ U(P)
such that Rej (T,P) ⊂ Rej (S,P)). With the help of an NP-oracle, the guess for Sˇ
can be verified in polynomial time. This concludes the proof that checking whether
r 6∈ Belmin(P ) is in ΣP2 .
Hardness of both tasks is shown by a simple reduction from the ΠP2 -hard irrele-
vance test in abduction from normal logic programs (Eiter et al., 1997b), which is
the following problem: Given a normal logic program P , a set of atoms H , a set of
literalsM , and an atom h0 ∈ H , decide whether h0 is not contained in any minimal
brave explanation of M , i.e., decide whether h0 /∈ E holds for each minimal E ⊆ H
(with respect to inclusion) such that P ∪ E has some stable model S with S |= L,
for all L ∈M .
The reduction is defined as follows: For each h ∈ H , let h′ and h′′ be fresh atoms,
and consider the update sequence P = (P1, P2), where
P1 = {¬h
′ ← | h ∈ H},
P2 = P ∪ { ← not L | L ∈M} ∪ {h← h
′, h′ ← not h′′, h′′ ← not h′ | h ∈ H}.
It can be shown that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the rejection sets
Rej (S,P) of the minimal answer sets S of P and the minimal brave explanations E
forM . In particular, the rule ¬h′0 ← is in Rej(S) iff h0 belongs to the corresponding
minimal explanation E. It follows that h0 ← ∈ Belmin(P) iff h0 is not contained
in any brave explanation for M , which establishes ΠP2 -hardness of (i). Since the
notions of minimal and strictly minimal answer sets coincide for update sequences
of length 2, we have that Belmin(P) = Belstr(P). Thus, Π
P
2 -hardness of (ii) holds
as well.
Similar results hold in the approach of Inoue and Sakama (1999). Furthermore,
they imply that minimal and strictly minimal answer sets can be polynomially
translated into disjunctive logic programming, which can serve as a basis for im-
plementation purposes. The next section deals with some algorithmic issues.
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6.2 Implementation
The notion of update sequence can be easily extended to the case where rules may
contain variables. As usual, the semantics of a program P containing variables is
defined in terms of the semantics of its ground instances P ∗ over the Herbrand
base. Rules r with variables X = X1, . . . , Xn are denoted r(X), and rejection of r
is represented by a predicate rej r(X); further details, can be found in (Eiter et al.,
2000b). In the rest of this section, we consider function-free update sequences P.
Since answer sets of (first-order) update sequences are defined by answer sets of
(first-order) ELPs, it is relative straightforward to implement the current update
approach. In fact, an implementation can be built on top of existing solvers for
answer set semantics. In the present case, we implemented updates as a front-end
for the logic programming tool DLV (Eiter et al., 1997a; Eiter et al., 1998). The lat-
ter system is a state-of-the-art solver for disjunctive logic programs (DLPs) under
the answer set semantics. It allows for non-ground rules and calculates answer sets
by performing a reduction to the stable model semantics. (Another highly efficient
logic programming implementation, realizing stable model semantics, is the system
smodels (Niemela¨ & Simons, 1996), which would similarly fit as underlying reason-
ing engine. We chose DLV because of familiarity and its optimization techniques for
grounding, as well as its expressiveness which would allow an integral solution to
compute strict and strictly minimal answer sets, respectively.) Formally, DLPs are
defined as ELPs where disjunctions may appear in the head of rules; the answer set
semantics for DLPs is due to Gelfond and Lifschitz (1991).
The implemented tasks agree with the decision problems discussed in the previous
section, i.e., they comprise the following problems: (i) checking the existence of an
answer set for a given update sequence, (ii) brave reasoning, and (iii) skeptical
reasoning; as well as the corresponding problems for minimal and strictly minimal
answer sets. All of these tasks have been realized for first-order update sequences,
employing the advanced grounding mechanism of DLV.
As regards the implementation for minimal and strictly minimal update answer
sets, although in principle it is possible to express the corresponding reasoning tasks
in terms of DLPs (which is a consequence of Theorem 9 and well-known express-
ibility results for the disjunctive answer set semantics (Eiter et al., 1997c)), we
chose instead to pursue a two-step evaluation approach for our purposes, remain-
ing within the present non-disjunctive framework, and, at the same time, adhering
more closer to the underlying intuitions. Roughly speaking, this two-step approach
can be described as follows: First, all candidates for minimal (strictly minimal) an-
swer sets are calculated, i.e., all answer sets of the update program P✁. Afterwards,
every candidate is tested for being minimal (strictly minimal).
Testing a candidate, S, for minimality (strict minimality) is performed by eval-
uating a test program, PminS (P
strict
S ), consisting of the rules of P✁ and a set of
additional rules. Intuitively, the additional rules constrain the answer sets of PminS
(PstrictS ) to those answer sets of P✁ having a smaller set of rejected rules compared
to the rules rejected by S (or to those answer sets of P✁ preferred over S, respec-
tively). Hence, the candidate S is minimal (strictly minimal) if the corresponding
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test program PminS (P
strict
S ) has no answer set. In the following subsections, the
implementation approach is described more formally.
6.2.1 Minimal Answer Sets
Definition 7
Let P✁ = P1 ✁ . . . ✁ Pn be a (first-order) update program and S an answer set of
P✁. Let ok be a new nullary predicate symbol (i.e., propositional atom) and, for
each predicate symbol rej r occurring in P✁, let sr be a new predicate symbol of
the same arity as rej r. Then, the minimality-test program with respect to S, P
min
S ,
consists of all rules and constraints of P✁, together with the following items:
(i) for each predicate symbol rej r occurring in P✁:
← rej r(X), not sr(X);
(ii) for each ground formula rej r(t) ∈ S:
ok ← not rej r(t);
sr(t) ← ;
(iii) the constraint
← not ok.
Note that in the above definition, only the rules and facts of (ii) manifest the
dependence of PminS from S. Informally, the constraints (i) eliminate all answer
sets with rejection sets which cannot be subsets of Rej (S,P), i.e., which reject at
least one rule not rejected in S. In the remaining answer sets, if any, either ok is
true, i.e., at least one rule which is rejected in S is not rejected in such a set, or ok
is false, in which case their rejection sets equal Rej (S,P), and thus these sets are
eliminated by Constraint (iii). Actually, the following proposition holds:
Theorem 10
Let S be an answer set of P✁. Then, S is a minimal answer set of P✁ iff P
min
S has
no answer set.
Proof
Only-if part. Suppose PminS has an answer set S
′. Then ok must be true in S′
due to the constraint (iii) of Definition 7. Since rules (ii) of Definition 7 are the
only ones in PminS with head ok, there exists a ground term rej r(t) ∈ S such that
rej r(t) /∈ S
′. Moreover, no ground term rej r′(t) ∈ S
′ \ S can exist due to the
constraints (i) of Definition 7. (Observe that rej r′(t) /∈ S implies sr′(t) /∈ S
′; hence,
if rej r′(t) ∈ S
′, then the body of one of the constraints is true in S′.) This proves
Rej (S′,PminS ) = Rej (S
′,P) ⊂ Rej (S,P).
Since the predicate symbols ok and sr do not occur in P✁, and P
min
S contains
all rules and constraints of P✁, results on the splitting of logic programs (Lifschitz
& Turner, 1994) imply that S˜ = S′ \ ({ok} ∪ {sr(t) | sr(t) ∈ S′}) is an answer set
of P✁. Given that Rej (S˜,P) = Rej (S
′,P) ⊂ Rej (S,P), we obtain that S is not
minimal.
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Algorithm Compute Minimal Models(P)
Input: A sequence of ELPs P = (P1 ,. . . ,Pn).
Output: All minimal answer sets of P.
var Cands : SetOfAnswerSets;
var MinModels : SetOfAnswerSets;
Cands := Compute Answer Sets(P✁);
for all S ∈ Cands do
var Counter : SetOfAnswerSets;
Counter := Compute Answer Sets(PminS );
if (Counter = ∅) then
MinModels := MinModels ∪ {S};
fi
rof
return MinModels;
Fig. 1. Algorithm to calculate minimal answer sets.
If part. Suppose S is not minimal. Then there exists an answer set S˜ of P✁ with
Rej (S˜,P) ⊂ Rej (S,P). Consider S′ = S˜ ∪ {ok} ∪ {sr(t) | rej r(t) ∈ S}. It is easily
verified that S˜ is an answer set of PminS .
This result allows us to calculate all minimal answer sets of P✁ using the straight-
forward algorithm depicted in Figure 1, which proceeds as follows: compute all an-
swer sets of P✁ and check for every answer set S if the corresponding minimality-
test program PminS has at least one answer set. If not, then add S to the set of
minimal answer sets of P✁.
6.2.2 Strictly Minimal Answer Sets
Definition 8
Let P✁ = P1 ✁ . . . ✁ Pn be a (first-order) update program and S an answer set of
P✁. Let ok, oki (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and eqi (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) be new nullary predicate
symbols, and, for each predicate symbol rej r occurring in P✁, let sr be a new
predicate symbol of the same arity as rej r. Then, the program P
strict
S consists of
all rules and constraints of P✁, together with the following items:
(i) for each predicate rej r occurring in P✁, corresponding to r ∈ Pi:
← rej r(X), not sr(X), eqi+1;
(ii) for each ground term rej r(t) ∈ S, corresponding to r ∈ Pi:
oki ← not rej r(t), eqi+1;
sr(t) ← ;
(iii) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
eqi ← eqi+1, not oki;
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ok ← oki;
(iv) the constraint
← not ok
and the fact
eqn+1 ← .
Again, program PstrictS depends on S only in virtue of Item (ii). The constraints
of Item (i) eliminate all answer sets S′ which cannot be preferred over S because
at some level i they reject a rule not rejected in S, and Rej j(S,P) = Rej j(S
′,P)
holds for j = i + 1, . . . , n (expressed by eqi+1). In the remaining answer sets, if
there is any, ok is either true, or false. If ok is true in S′, then oki is true in S
′
for some level i, i.e., S′ does not reject a rule of Pi which is rejected in S, and
Rej j(S,P) = Rej j(S
′,P) for j = i + 1, . . . , n. In this case, S′ is preferred over S.
If, however, ok is false in S′, then Rej i(S,P) = Rej i(S
′,P), for i = 1, . . . , n, and
S′ is killed by the constraint of Item (iv).
An equivalent result as for minimality-test programs holds for the above test
programs as well. Hence, the same algorithm using PstrictS instead of P
min
S can be
used to compute all strictly minimal answer sets of P✁.
Theorem 11
Let S be an answer set of P✁. Then, S is a strictly minimal answer set of P✁ iff
PstrictS has no answer set.
Proof
Only-if part. Suppose PstrictS has an answer set S
′. Then ok must be true in S′,
due to Constraint (iv) of Definition 8. Since the rules of Item (iii) of Definition 8
are the only ones in PstrictS with head ok, there exists some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that
oki ∈ S′. This implies that the body of the corresponding rule of (ii) must be true
in S′. Hence, there exists a ground term rej r(t) ∈ S \ S
′, where r ∈ Pi and such
that eqi+1 ∈ S′. Moreover, except for the fact eqn+1 ← , the rules of (iii) are the
only ones in PstrictS with eq predicate symbols in their heads, so that eqi+1 implies
eqj ∈ S′ and okj /∈ S′ for j = i + 1, . . . , n if i < n. From this, and the constraints
of (i), it follows that no ground term rej r′(t)S
′ \ S, r′ ∈ Pj , j = i, . . . , n, can exist
(rej r′(t) /∈ S implies sr′(t) /∈ S
′; hence, having rej r′(t) ∈ S
′ and eqj+1 ∈ S′, the
body of one of the constraints is true in S′). It also follows that for every r′ ∈ Pj ,
j = i+1, . . . , n, if rej r′(t) ∈ S, then rej r′(t) ∈ S
′ (otherwise the body of one of the
rules of (ii) would be true in S′, implying okj ∈ S′, a contradiction).
Summarizing, we have shown Rej i(S
′,PstrictS ) = Rej i(S
′,P✁) ⊂ Rej i(S,P✁)
and Rej j(S
′,PstrictS ) = Rej j(S
′,P✁) = Rej j(S,P✁), for j = i + 1, . . . , n. So, S
′ is
preferred over S.
Since none of the predicate symbols ok, eq, and sr occurs in P✁, and P
strict
S
contains all rules and constraints of P✁, by a similar argument as in the proof
of Theorem 10 (i.e., invoking splitting results from (Lifschitz & Turner, 1994)) it
follows that
S˜ = S′ \ ({ok, oki} ∪ {eqj | j = i+ 1, . . . , n+ 1} ∪ {sr(t) | sr(t) ∈ S
′})
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is an answer set of P✁. Given that Rej (S˜,P✁) = Rej (S
′,P✁), we obtain that S˜ is
preferred over S. Consequently, S is not a strictly minimal answer set.
If part. Suppose S is not a strictly minimal answer set. Then there exists an answer
set S˜ of P✁ which is preferred over S. In particular, there exists some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
such that Rej j(S˜,P✁) = Rej j(S,P✁) for j = i + 1, . . . , n and Rej i(S˜,P✁) ⊂
Rej i(S,P✁). Consider
S′ = S˜ ∪ {ok, oki} ∪ {eqj | j = i+ 1, . . . , n+ 1} ∪ {sr(t) | rej r(t) ∈ S}.
It is easily verified that S˜ is an answer set of PstrictS .
7 Relations to Other Approaches
In this section, we analyze the relations between the current update framework and
other formalisms. First of all, we discuss the connection with inheritance programs
by Buccafurri et al. (1999a), which has not been introduced as a formalism for
updates but can be successfully interpreted as such, coming to an equivalence result
with our update sequences over the common fragment.
In a second step, we study the relation on the one hand to the approach of
Leite and Pereira (1997), also modeling Revision Programming by Marek and
Truszczyn´ski (1994), on the other hand to dynamic logic programming (Alferes
et al., 1998; Alferes et al., 2000), which is close in spirit to the present update
method, in the sense that update sequences are translated to standard logic pro-
grams. In particular, we describe the semantical differences between our update
programs and dynamic programs, and identify a wide class of logic programs for
which they yield the same results.
Then, we briefly discuss update approaches for logic programs based on preference
handling (Zhang & Foo, 1998) and abduction (Inoue & Sakama, 1999). Finally, we
mention a method due to Delgrande, Schaub, and Tompits (2000) for handling
preference information in the context of logic programs, which is also based on an
encoding to ELPs.
7.1 Relation to Inheritance Programs
The update semantics we suggest resolves conflicts by assigning “preference” to
the more recent information. As already pointed out earlier, this can also be inter-
preted as some form of inheritance mechanism, where the more recent information
is considered as being more specific. In this section, we discuss this aspect in more
detail. To wit, we consider the inheritance approach introduced by Buccafurri et
al. (1999a) and we show that update sequences can equivalently be described in
terms of inheritance programs.
In what follows, we briefly describe the basic layout of the inheritance approach
by Buccafurri et al. (1999a). Since that method has originally been specified for
non-ground DLPs, and we deal here only with non-disjunctive ELPs, we adapt
some of the original definitions accordingly.
A DLP<-program, P<, is a finite set {〈o1, P1〉, . . . , 〈on, Pn〉} of object identifiers
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oi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and associated ELPs Pi, together with a strict partial order “<”
between object identifiers ( pairs 〈oi, Pi〉 are called objects).5 As well, we say that P<
is a DLP<-program over a set of atomsA iffA denotes the set of all atoms appearing
in P<. Informally, possible conflicts in determining properties of the objects are
resolved in favor of rules which are more specific according to the hierarchy, in the
sense that rule r ∈ Pk is considered to represent more specific information than rule
r′ ∈ Pl whenever ok < ol holds (1 ≤ k, l ≤ n and k 6= l). In the following, ρ(P
<)
denotes the multiset of all rules appearing in the programs of P<.
Consider some DLP<-program P< over a set of atoms A. Let I ⊆ LitA be
an interpretation and let r1 ∈ P and r2 ∈ P ′ be two conflicting rules, where
〈o, P 〉, 〈o′, P ′〉 ∈ P<. Then, r1 overrides r2 in I iff (i) o < o′, (ii) H(r1) is true in
I, and (iii) B(r2) is true in I. A rule r ∈ ρ(P<) is overridden in I iff there exists
some r′ ∈ ρ(P<) which overrides r in I.
An interpretation I ⊆ LitA is a model of P< iff every rule in ρ(P<) is either
overridden or true in I; moreover, I is minimal iff it is the least model of all
these rules. The reduct, GI(P
<), of the DLP<-program P< relative to I results
from ρ(P<) by (i) deleting any rule r ∈ ρ(P<) which is either overridden in I
or defeated by I; and (ii) deleting all weakly negated literals in the bodies of the
remaining rules of ρ(P<). Then, I is an answer set of P< iff it is a minimal model
of GI(P
<).
This concludes our brief review of the inheritance framework of (Buccafurri et al.,
1999a); we continue with our correspondence result.
Theorem 12
S ⊆ LitA is an answer set of the update sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) overA iff S is an
answer set of the DLP<-program P< = {〈o1, P1〉, . . . , 〈on, Pn〉} having inheritance
order on < on−1 < · · · < o1.
Proof
We first note the following two properties, which can be verified in a straightforward
way. Let I ⊆ LitA be some interpretation and r ∈ ρ(P<). Then:
(i) If r ∈ Rej (I,P), then r is overridden in I.
(ii) Assume I satisfies for any r′ ∈ ρ(P<) the condition that B(r′) is true in I
whenever H(r′) is true in I. Then, r is overridden in I only if r ∈ Rej (I,P).
We proceed with the proof of the main result. Suppose S is an answer set of P =
(P1, . . . , Pn). We show S is an answer set of P
< = {〈o1, P1〉, . . . , 〈on, Pn〉} with
inheritance order on < on−1 < · · · < o1.
First, we show that S is a model of GS(P
<). Consider some r ∈ GS(P<). Then,
there is some rule rˆ ∈ ρ(P<) such that r = rˆ+ and rˆ is neither overridden in
S nor defeated by S. Applying Property (i), we get that rˆ /∈ Rej (S,P). Hence,
rˆ ∈ (∪P \Rej (S,P))S since rˆ is not defeated by S. Thus, given that S is an answer
5 Strictly speaking, in the current context, the term “DLP<-program” (as introduced by Bucca-
furri et al. (1999a)) is a bit of a misnomer, because “DLP” points to disjunctive logic programs;
however, we retained the original name for reference’s sake.
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set of P, Theorem 4 implies that r = rˆ+ is true in S. It follows that S is a model
of GS(P
<).
Next, we show that there is no proper subset of S which is also a model of
GS(P
<). Suppose there is such a set S0 ⊂ S. Since S is an answer set of P,
Property (ii) can be applied, and we obtain r ∈ GS(P<) whenever r ∈ (∪P \
Rej (S,P))S holds. As a consequence, S0 is a model of r ∈ (∪P\Rej (S,P))
S , which
contradicts the fact that S is an answer set of P. This concludes the proof that S
is an answer set of P< if S is an answer set of P.
For the converse direction, assume S is an answer set of P<. Similar to the argu-
mentation given above, Property (ii) implies that S is a model of (∪P\Rej (S,P))S .
As well, S is a minimal model of (∪P \Rej (S,P))S , because otherwise Property (i)
would yield a proper subset S0 of S being a model of GS(P
<), contradicting the
fact that such a subset S0 cannot exist, because S is an answer of P
<.
Inheritance programs are also related to ordered logic programs, due to Laenens et
al. (1990) and further analyzed by Buccafurri et al. (1996). The difference between
inheritance programs and ordered logic programs is that the latter ones have a built-
in contradiction removal feature, which eliminates local inconsistencies in a given
hierarchy of programs. Thus, for linearly ordered programs P1 < P2 < · · · < Pn
where such inconsistencies do not occur, e.g., if for any two conflicting rules in Pi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) their bodies cannot be simultaneously satisfied, the above equivalence
result holds for ordered logic programs as well.
7.2 Revision Programs and the Approach of Leite and Pereira
In the framework of Marek and Truszczyn´ski (1994), a knowledge base is a collection
of positive facts, and revision programs specify conditional insertions or removals
of facts under a semantics very similar to the stable semantics. In discussing this
approach, Leite and Pereira (1997) argued that the approach of revision programs
is not adequate if more complex knowledge is represented in the form of logic pro-
grams, because revision programs compute only “model-by-model updates”, which
do not capture the additional information encoded by logic programs. Accordingly,
they proposed an extended framework in which a suitable inertia principle for rules
realizes the update independently of any specific model of the original program. In
the following, we briefly sketch their approach.
In a first step, Leite and Pereira (1997) define their approach for normal logic
programs, and afterwards they extend it to handle programs with strong negation
as well. Furthermore, (Leite & Pereira, 1997) deals only with the situation where a
given program is updated by a single program; the general case involving an arbi-
trary number of updates is described in (Leite, 1997). We describe here the latter
approach, but, for the sake of simplicity, only the case of normal logic programs.
Following the method of revision programs (Marek & Truszczyn´ski, 1994), an
update program in the sense of (Leite & Pereira, 1997) is a finite collection of rules
of the form
in(A) ← in(B1), . . . , in(Bm), out(C1), . . . , out(Cn), and (1)
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out(A′) ← in(B′1), . . . , in(B
′
m), out(C
′
1), . . . , out(C
′
n), (2)
where A,A′, Bi, B
′
i, Cj , C
′
j are atoms (1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n). Intuitively, Rule (1)
states that A should be true given that B1, . . . , Bm are true and C1, . . . , Cn are
false, and a similar meaning holds for Rule (2). Rule (1) is called an in-rule, and
Rule (2) is an out-rule. Semantically, in-rule (1) is interpreted as the logic program
rule
A ← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn,
whilst out-rule (2) is interpreted as
¬A ← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn.
When speaking about update programs, in the following they are always identified
with finite sets of rules of the above form. Let us call a sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn)
of such programs an IO-sequence (for “sequence of in- and out-rules”). Consider
an IO-sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over A, and let S ⊆ LitA be a set of literals.
Leite (1997) introduces the following notion of a rejection set (for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n):
Rejected(S, i, j) =
⋃
i<k≤j{ r ∈ Pi | ∃r
′ ∈ Pk such that r and r′ are conflicting
and S |= B(r) ∪B(r′) }.
Then, S ∩A is a P-justified update at state j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) iff S is an answer set of
⋃
i≤j
(Pi \ Rejected(S, i, j)),
provided that each program
⋃
i≤l(Pi \ Rejected(S, i, j)), for l < j, possesses an
answer set.6
It is easily seen that for P = (P1, . . . , Pn) and S as above, S is an answer set of⋃
i≤n(Pi\Rejected(S, i, j)) iff it is an answer set of ∪P\Rej
′(S,P), where Rej ′(S,P)
is the weak form of a rejection set, as defined in Section 3.2. Hence, we can state
the following proposition:
Theorem 13
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an IO-sequence over A and S ⊆ LitA a set of literals.
Assume that each subsequence (P1, . . . , Pj) has an answer set, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then,
S is an answer set of P iff it is a P-justified update at state n.
Concerning the extended framework of Leite and Pereira in which rules of the
form (1) and (2) may contain literals instead of plain atoms, only a weaker cor-
respondence result holds. Omitting further details, we just mention that in this
case our framework corresponds to Leite and Pereira’s providing update sequences
contain only in-rules.
6 Strictly speaking, Leite (1997) requires that, for each l ≤ j,
⋃
i≤l
(Pi \ Rejected(S, i, j)) has a
consistent answer set. However, in our setting, answer sets are always consistent.
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7.3 Dynamic Logic Programming
Alferes et al. (1998; 2000) introduced the concept of dynamic logic programs as
a generalization of both the idea of updating interpretations through revision pro-
grams (Marek & Truszczyn´ski, 1994) and of updating programs as defined by Alferes
and Pereira (1997) and by Leite and Pereira (1997). Syntactically, dynamic logic
programs are based on generalized logic programs (GLPs), which allow default nega-
tion in the head of rules, but no strong negation whatsoever.
In dynamic logic programming (DynLP in the following), the models of a sequence
of updates are defined as the stable models of the program resulting from a syntactic
rewriting, similar to the transformation used in our approach. This is called a
dynamic update. Elements of the sequence are GLPs.
Regarding the formalisms discussed in the previous subsection, in (Alferes et al.,
2000) it is demonstrated that revision programs and dynamic updates are equiv-
alent, provided that the original knowledge is extensional, i.e., the initial program
contains only rules of the form A← or not A← .
Our analysis of dynamic updates can be summarized as follows. First, basic def-
initions and semantical characterizations of dynamic update programs are given.
Afterwards, the relation between dynamic updates and updates according to Defini-
tion 2 is investigated. Since the two approaches are defined over different languages,
the comparison must include suitable translations to take this distinction into ac-
count. As a matter of fact, Alferes et al. (2000) already discussed how ELPs can
be handled within their framework; likewise, we define a similar translation schema
such that GLPs can be treated by our update method.
As it turns out, there is a semantic difference between dynamic updates and up-
dates according to Definition 2. Although any dynamic update is an update answer
set in the sense of Definition 2, the converse does not hold in general. Intuitively, this
can be explained by the fact that dynamic updates are more restrictive as regards to
certain circularities in the given update information. On the other hand, we provide
sufficient conditions under which both approaches yield equivalent results. These
conditions are formulated by means of suitable graph-theoretical concepts and ef-
fectively eliminate the possibility of such circular behavior as mentioned above.
We also briefly discuss that dynamic logic programs do not eliminate all kinds of
circularities.
In view of this equivalence over a wide class of logic programs, the analysis of
update principles we presented in Section 4 applies to dynamic logic programs as
well. Furthermore, similar complexity results for dynamic logic programs can be
concluded, based on the constructions in Section 6.1.
7.3.1 Semantics of Dynamic Logic Programs
Given an update sequenceP = (P1, . . . , Pn) of GLPs overA, letAdyn beA extended
by new, pairwise distinct atoms A−, Ai, A
−
i , APi , A
−
Pi
, and reject(Ai), for each
A ∈ A and each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The dynamic update program P⊕ = P1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Pn
over Adyn is defined as the GLP consisting of the following items:
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Fig. 2. “Top-down” evaluation of update sequences (left diagram) vs. “bottom-up”
evaluation of dynamic logic programs (right diagram).
(i) for each r ∈ Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with B−(r) = {C1, . . . , Cn}:
APi ← B
+(r), C−1 , . . . , C
−
n if H(r) = A;
A−Pi ← B
+(r), C−1 , . . . , C
−
n if H(r) = not A;
(ii) for each atom A occurring in P and each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
Ai ← APi ; reject(A
−
i−1) ← APi ;
A−i ← A
−
Pi
; reject(Ai−1) ← A
−
Pi
;
A−i ← A
−
i−1, not reject(A
−
i−1);
Ai ← Ai−1, not reject(Ai−1);
(iii) for each atom A occurring in P:
A−0 ← ; A← An; A
− ← A−n ; not A← A
−
n .
One major difference can immediately be identified between our update pro-
grams and dynamic updates: In dynamic updates, the value of each atom is de-
termined from the bottom level P1 upwards towards Pn (in virtue of rules Ai ←
Ai−1, not reject(Ai−1) and A← An for positive atoms, and the corresponding ones
for dashed atoms), whilst update programs determine such values in a downward
fashion (cf. rules Li ← Li+1 and L← L1 in Definition 2). This difference is visually
depicted in Figure 2. More importantly, the different evaluation strategy leads in
effect to different semantics, which will be shown later on.
Before we can properly define the semantics of dynamic updates, based on the
transformation P⊕ introduced above, we must emphasize that Alferes et al. (1998;
2000) use a slightly non-standard concept of stable models. To wit, weakly negated
literals not A (A some atom) are treated like ordinary propositional atoms, so that
rules A0 ← A1, . . . , Am, not Am+1, . . . , not An are effectively be viewed as proposi-
tional Horn formulas. Accordingly, an interpretation I is in this context understood
as a set consisting of atoms and weakly negated atoms such that for each atom A
it holds that A ∈ I iff not A /∈ I. To distinguish such interpretations from inter-
pretations in the usual sense, we call them generalized interpretations. As usual,
a set B, comprised of atoms and weakly negated atoms, is true in a generalized
interpretation I, symbolically I |= B, iff B ⊆ I. Towards defining stable models,
the following notation is required:
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Let A be a set of atoms. Then, not A denotes the set {not A | A ∈ A}. Fur-
thermore, for M ⊆ A ∪ not A, we set M− = {not A | not A ∈ M}, and, for
Z ∈ A∪ not A, we define not Z = not A if Z = A and not Z = A if Z = not A. For
a program P over A, the deductive closure, CnA(P ), is given by the set
{L | L ∈ A ∪ not A and P ⊢ L},
where P is interpreted as a propositional Horn theory and “⊢” denotes classical
derivability. Usually, the subscript “A” will be omitted from CnA(P ). A generalized
interpretation S is a stable model of a program P iff S = Cn(P ∪ S−).
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of GLPs over A, and let I be a generalized
interpretation. Alferes et al. (1998; 2000) introduce the following concepts:
Rejected(I,P) =
⋃n
i=1{r ∈ Pi | ∃r
′ ∈ Pj , for some j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}, such
that H(r′) = not H(r) and I |= B(r) ∪B(r′)};
Defaults(I,P) = {not A | 6 ∃r in P such that H(r) = A and I |= B(r)}.
Then, it holds that S′ ⊆ Adyn is a stable model of P⊕ iff S = S′ ∩A satisfies the
following condition:
S = Cn((∪P \ Rejected(S,P)) ∪Defaults(S,P)).
The set S is called a dynamic stable model of P.
Alferes et al. (2000) defined also an extension of their semantics to the three-
valued case: Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of ELPs over A. Then, a consistent
set S ⊆ LitA is a dynamic answer set of P iff S∪{not L | L ∈ LitA\S} is a dynamic
stable model of the sequence P = (P1, . . . , Pn ∪ {not A ← ¬A, not ¬A ← A | A ∈
A}) of GLPs. Here, the rules in {not A ← ¬A, not ¬A ← A | A ∈ A} serve for
emulating classical negation through weak negation.
7.3.2 Relating Dynamic Answer Sets and Update Answer Sets
Let us now define how GLPs are to be rewritten in order to constitute a valid input
for update programs according to Definition 2. For any rule r, by r◦ we denote the
rule which results from r by replacing weak negation occurring in the head of r by
strong negation, i.e.,
r◦ =
{
¬A← B(r) if H(r) = not A;
r otherwise.
Furthermore, for any GLP P , we define P ◦ = {r◦ | r ∈ P}.
Definition 9
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of GLPs over A. Then, the update sequence
Q(P) is given by the sequence (P ◦1 , . . . , P
◦
n ∪ {¬A← not A | A ∈ A).
Notice that the part {¬A ← not A | A ∈ A} serves for making all answer
sets complete. Moreover, no strong negation occurs in rule bodies of Q(P). Thus,
application of a rule with ¬A in the head can never lead to the application of further
rules; it can only enable that rules with A in their heads are overridden. As well,
the rules in {¬A← not A | A ∈ A} are not able to override any rule in Q(P).
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Theorem 14
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be any sequence of GLPs over a set of atoms A, and let
S ⊆ A ∪ not A be a dynamic stable model of P. Then, (S ∩ A) ∪ ¬(A \ S) is an
answer set of Q(P).
Proof
Given a set S ⊆ A ∪ not A such that
S = Cn((∪P \ Rejected(S,P)) ∪Defaults(S,P)),
we have to show that S′ = (S ∩ A) ∪ ¬(A \ S) is an answer set of Q(P), i.e., S′ is
a minimal model of
(( n⋃
i=1
P ◦i ∪ {¬A← not A | A ∈ A}
)
\ Rej (S′,Q(P))
)S′
.
Let us suppose this is not the case, i.e., either the set S′ is not a model of the
resulting program, or there is a set S′′ ⊂ S′ such that S′′ is a model too.
If S′ is not a model of
(( n⋃
i=1
P ◦i ∪ {¬A← not A | A ∈ A}
)
\ Rej (S′,Q(P))
)S′
,
then there is a rule r ∈ (
⋃n
i=1 P
◦
i ∪{¬A← not A | A ∈ A})\Rej (S
′,Q(P)) such that
B(r) is satisfied by S′ but H(r) 6∈ S′. It follows from the construction of S′ that such
a rule r cannot be of the form ¬A← not A, therefore r ∈ (
⋃n
i=1 P
◦
i )\Rej (S
′,Q(P))
must hold. Let us call r˜ the rule in P corresponding to r. First of all, invoking
Theorem 5, we can observe that
{r˜ | r ∈
( n⋃
i=1
P ◦i
)
\ Rej (S′,Q(P)} ⊆ ((∪P \Rejected(S,P)) ∪Defaults(S,P)).
Since the body of r is true in S′, we have S |= B(r˜) too, because of the construction
of S′ and given that B(r) = B(r˜). Now, ifH(r) is a positive literal,H(r) 6∈ S′ entails
H(r) 6∈ S, contradicting the assumption that S is a dynamic stable model of P. If,
on the other hand, H(r) is a weakly negated atom not A, from the construction of
S′ we can deduct that not A is not in S, contradicting the hypothesis as well.
Assume now that S′′ ⊂ S′ is a model of
(( n⋃
i=1
P ◦i ∪ {¬A← not A | A ∈ A}
)
\ Rej (S′,Q(P))
)S′
.
Suppose S′′ and S′ differ on the literal L, i.e., L ∈ S′ but L /∈ S′′. But this would
mean, by construction of S′, that a set S˜ ⊂ S exists which is also a dynamic stable
model of P , thus contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore, S′ is an answer set of
((
⋃n
i=1 P
◦
i ∪ {¬A← not A | A ∈ A}) \Rej (S
′,Q(P)))S
′
.
Theorem 15
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of ELPs overA. Suppose S ⊆ LitA is a dynamic
answer set of P. Then, S ∈ U(P).
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Proof
Let us denote classical negation in P by ∼A, and rewrite S accordingly, i.e., S′ =
(S ∩A)∪ ({∼A | ¬A ∈ S}). Then, by combining the emulation of classical negation
in P through rules not A← ∼A and not ∼A← A (A ∈ A), and the transformation
Q(·), we obtain by Theorem 14 that the set
S′′ = S′ ∪ ¬({A,∼A | A ∈ A} \ S′)
is an answer set of P′ = (P1, . . . , Pn∪Q), where each∼A is viewed as a propositional
atom and Q contains for each atom A ∈ A the following rules:
¬ ∼A ← A;
¬A ← ∼A;
¬ ∼A ← not ∼A;
¬A ← not A.
Observe that ∼A ∈ S′′ implies A /∈ S′, and A ∈ S′′ implies ¬A /∈ S′′. Furthermore,
atoms ∼A or A are included in S′′ due to applications of rules r ∈ Pi, 1,≤ i ≤ n,
which are not rejected.
By induction on i (0 ≤ i < n) one can show that Rejn−i(S′′,P
′) = Rejn−i(S,P)
holds. It follows that S is a minimal model of ((∪P) \ Rej (S,P))S , i.e., S is an
answer set of P.
Theorems 14 and 15 do not hold in the converse direction. This can be seen by
the following example:
Example 5
Consider programs P1, P2, and P
′
2, where
P1 = { it is raining← };
P2 = { not it is raining← not it is raining };
P ′2 = { ¬it is raining← not it is raining }.
The sequence P = (P1, P2) of GLPs has one dynamic stable model, {it is raining},
but Q(P) has two answer sets, {it is raining} and {¬it is raining}. Likewise, the
sequence P′ = (P1, P
′
2) of ELPs has also {it is raining} as single dynamic stable
model, but {it is raining} and {¬it is raining} are answer sets of P′.
Intuitively, the syntactic mechanism responsible for the elimination of some stable
models in dynamic updates is the renaming of weakly negated literals in the body
of rules. This renaming ensures that weakly negated literals are not derived in a
cyclic way, i.e., the truth value of a weakly negated literal has to be supported
by other information besides the literal itself. This, however, is in general not the
case with the transformation for update programs based on Definition 2. In the
next section we present conditions under which both approaches yield equivalent
results. As well, we illustrate that the approach of Alferes et al. (1998; 2000) does
not eliminate all kinds of cyclic informations.
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7.3.3 Equivalence of Dynamic Stable Models and Update Answer Sets
In the sequel, we use AND/OR-graphs to identify classes of logic programs for which
update answer sets and dynamic stable models coincide. Moreover, we present a
graph condition which holds precisely in case an update answer set does not cor-
respond to a dynamic stable model. AND/OR-graphs are frequently employed to
model problem reductions, and belong to the category of hypergraphs, i.e., graphs
where nodes are connected by hypernodes (also called connectors), represented as
a tuple of nodes. Formally, an AND/OR-graph is a pair G = 〈N,C〉, where N is
a finite set of AND-nodes or OR-nodes, and C ⊆ N ×
⋃|N |
i=0N
i is a set of con-
nectors such that C is a function, i.e., for each I ∈ N there is at most one tuple
〈O1, . . . , Ok〉 ∈
⋃|N |
i=0N
i such that 〈I, O1, . . . , Ok〉 ∈ C. We call I the input node
and O1, . . . , Ok the output nodes of 〈I, O1, . . . , Ok〉 ∈ C. As well, 〈I, O1, . . . , Ok〉
itself is referred to as a k-connector.
The concept of a path, as defined in ordinary graphs, can be generalized to
AND/OR-graphs as follows. Let 〈R,O1, . . . , Ok〉, k ≥ 0, be the connector for a
node R in G. A tree p is a path rooted at R in G if the following conditions hold:
(i) if k = 0, then p = 〈R〉;
(ii) if k > 0 and R is an AND-node, then p = 〈R, p1, . . . , pk〉, where p1, . . . , pk are
paths rooted at O1, . . . , Ok in G; and
(iii) if k > 0 and R is an OR-node, then p = 〈R, pi〉, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where pi
is a path rooted at Oi in G.
Note that p might be an infinite tree. Furthermore, the graph associated with
a path p, G(p), is the directed graph whose nodes are the nodes of G occurring
in p and whose edges contain, for every node R in the recursive definition of p,
R→ O1, . . . , R→ Ok if R is an AND-node, and R→ Oi if R is an OR-node.
Next, we will define how an AND/OR-graph can be assigned to an update se-
quence P = (P1, . . . , Pn), and how such a graph can be reduced with respect to a
set of literals S.
Definition 10
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of GLPs over A. We associate with P an
AND/OR-graph, GP = 〈N,C〉, in the following way:
(i) the set N consists of AND-nodes r for every rule r in P, and OR-nodes Z for
every Z ∈ H(r′) ∪B(r′) and every r′ in P;
(ii) the set C consists of (k + l)-connectors 〈r, A′1, . . . , A
′
k, not A
′
1, . . . , not A
′
l〉 for
every rule r in P of the form H(r)← A1, . . . , Ak, not A′1, . . . , not A
′
l, k, l ≥ 0,
and of m-connectors 〈Z, r1, . . . , , rm〉 for all rules r1, . . . , , rm in P such that
H(ri) = Z, where Z ∈ A ∪ not A.
Definition 11
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of GLPs over A and let S ⊆ A ∪ not A be a
generalized interpretation. The reduced AND/OR-graph of P with respect to S, GSP,
is the graph resulting from GP by:
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(1) removing all AND-nodes r and their connectors (as well as removing r from
all connectors containing it as output node), if either r ∈ Rejected(S,P) or
S 6|= B(r) holds; and
(2) replacing, for every atomA, the connector of not A by the 0-connector 〈not A〉,
if A is associated with a 0-connector after Step (1) and no r ∈ Rejected(S,P)
exists such that H(r) = A.
Using the definitions above, we are able to state a simple graph condition ex-
pressing correspondence between update answer sets and dynamic stable models.
Theorem 16
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of GLPs over A and let S ⊆ LitA be an answer
set of Q(P). Then, the corresponding generalized interpretation S′ = {A | A ∈
S}∪{notA | ¬A ∈ S} is a dynamic stable model of P iff, for every atom A ∈ A\S,
one of the following conditions holds:
(i) For every rule r in P such that H(r) = A, S′ 6|= B(r).
(ii) There exists a path p in GS
′
P , rooted at notA, such that G(p) is acyclic.
Proof
See (Eiter et al., 2000b).
The next theorem addresses the case of ELPs.
Theorem 17
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of ELPs over A and let S ⊆ LitA be an answer
set of P. Furthermore, let P′ = (P1, . . . , Pn∪{not A← ¬A, not ¬A← A | A ∈ A})
and S′ = S ∪ {not L | L ∈ LitA \ S}. Then, S is a dynamic answer set of P iff, for
every literal L ∈ LitA \ S, one of the following conditions holds:
(i) For every rule r in P′ such that H(r) = L, S′ 6|= B(r).
(ii) There exists a path p in GS
′
P′ rooted at notL, such that G(p) is acyclic.
Proof
See (Eiter et al., 2000b).
Theorem 16 and Theorem 17 allow us to identify classes of update programs for
which update answer sets and dynamic stable models coincide. If, for example, a
cyclic path rooted at not A depends on A, then a reduction of the graph with respect
to an answer set will break it open since an answer set either contains A, or not.
Also, if the graph associated with an update sequence does not contain any cyclic
paths rooted at weakly negated literals, then the second condition of Theorem 16
is always fulfilled.
Corollary 1
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of GLPs over A. If every cyclic path rooted
at not A in GP also contains node A, then there is a one-to-one correspondence
between answer sets of Q(P) and dynamic stable models of P. In particular, this
holds if GP does not contain any cyclic path rooted at a not A node.
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This corollary can further be specialized to a condition which can be checked
efficiently (namely in O(|A| · ‖P‖) time, where ‖P‖ denotes the size of P).
Corollary 2
Let P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) be a sequence of GLPs over A and let G =
⋃
pG(p) be the
union of the graphs for all paths p in GP. Suppose that, for every node notA in G, it
holds that every cycle containing not A also contains A. Then, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between answer sets of Q(P) and dynamic stable models of P.
Example 6
Consider the following sequence P = (P1, P2, P3) of GLPs, taken from (Alferes
et al., 1998):
P1 =
{
r1 : sleep← not tv on, r2 : tv on← , r3 : watch tv← tv on
}
;
P2 =
{
r4 : not tv on← power failure, r5 : power failure←
}
;
P3 =
{
r6 : not power failure←
}
.
There are only two not A nodes in G with outgoing edges, namely not tv on and
not power failure. Both are connected with a single rule node: the former with r4,
and the latter with r6, which is a terminal node. Node r4 has a single edge leading
to power failure, which is in turn connected with a single rule node, namely r5, a
terminal node. Thus, there does not exist a cycle in G containing not A. Hence,
update answer sets of Q(P) and dynamic stable models of P coincide (modulo the
different language). In fact, P has the single dynamic stable model
{notpower failure, tv on,watch tv, notsleep},
which corresponds to the single update answer set of Q(P), given by:
{¬power failure, tv on,watch tv,¬sleep}.
Having dealt with aspects of equivalence between dynamic stable models and up-
date answer sets, let us now discuss their differences. Recalling the update sequence
P = (P1, P2) and P
′ = (P1, P
′
2) from Example 5, the single dynamic stable model
{it is raining} of P seems, in the sense of inertia, more intuitive than the answer
set {¬it is raining} of P′ = Q(P) because the tautological update information
P3 = {not it is raining← not it is raining}
is quite irrelevant to the fact that it is raining, as given by
P1 = {it is raining←}.
So, in some sense, the semantics of Alferes et al. (1998; 2000) eliminates unintended
stable models, as it does not allow for cyclic derivations of negative information.
However, the rewritten rule of
P ′2 = {¬it is raining← not it is raining}
differs in that it allows to conclude that it is not raining given that there is no
information whether it is raining. In this sense, both answer sets {it is raining}
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and {¬it is raining} are, in principle, reasonable. Observing that the more intuitive
answer set of P′ is minimal while the other is not, one can use the notion of
minimality to filter out the unintended answer set. But, in general, there exist
dynamic stable models such that the corresponding answer sets are not minimal
(or strictly minimal) and vice versa. Also, acyclic derivations of negative information
do not always capture the intuition of inertia as shown by the following example:
Example 7
Let us consider a slight modification of Example 5, where the knowledge base
P = { it is raining← , it is cloudy← it is raining }
is updated by the information
U = {not it is raining← not it is cloudy},
which, by the same intuition of inertia, is also irrelevant to the fact that it is now
actually raining and thus cloudy. However, this yields two dynamic stable models
S′1 = {it is raining, it is cloudy};
S′2 = {not it is raining, not it is cloudy},
corresponding to the answer sets
S1 = S
′
1;
S2 = {¬it is raining,¬it is cloudy}
of the rewritten ELP7, showing that also the mechanisms enacted in DynLP do not
completely avoid cyclic derivations.
Despite their differences, the general properties of program updates, as investi-
gated in Section 4, hold for dynamic logic programs also. By virtue of Theorem 17
and Corollary 2, one can easily verify that every counterexample for an invalid
property belongs to a class where update answer sets and dynamic stable models
coincide. As well, arguments similar to those used for the demonstrations of the
valid properties of Section 4 can be found in order to show that these properties
also hold for dynamic logic programs.
7.4 Program Updates Through Abduction
The use of abduction for solving update problems in logic programming and data-
bases goes back to (Kakas & Mancarella, 1990). Taking advantage of their frame-
work of extended abduction (Inoue & Sakama, 1995), Inoue and Sakama (1999)
integrated three different types of updates into a single framework, namely view
update, theory update, and inconsistency removal. In particular, view update deals
with the problem of changing extensional facts (which do not occur in the heads of
7 Similar to Example 5, here, the intuitively preferred answer set is also a minimal answer set,
while the other is not.
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rules), whilst theory update covers the general case in which (a set of) rules should
be incorporated into a knowledge base. We discuss the latter problem here.
Informally, for ELPs P1 and P2, an update of P1 by P2 is a largest program
P ′ such that P1 ⊆ P ′ ⊆ P1 ∪ P2 holds and where P ′ is consistent (i.e., P ′ has a
consistent answer set). This intuition is formally captured by reducing the problem
of updating P1 with P2 to computing a minimal set of abducible rules Q ⊆ P1 \P2
such that (P1 ∪P2)\Q is consistent. In technical terms of (Inoue & Sakama, 1995),
the program P1 ∪ P2 is considered for abduction where the rules in P1 \ P2 are
abducible, and the intended update is realized via a minimal anti-explanation for
falsity, which removes abducible rules to restore consistency.
While this looks similar to our minimal updates, there is, however, a salient
difference: abductive update does not respect causal rejection. That is, a rule r
from P1 \ P2 may be rejected even if no rule r′ in P2 fires whose head contradicts
the application of r. For example, consider P1 = {q ← ,¬q ← a} and P2 = {a←}.
Both P1 and P2 have consistent answer sets, but (P1, P2) has no (consistent) answer
set because no rule in P1 is rejected and thus both rules must fire. On the other
hand, in Inoue and Sakama’s approach, one of the two rules in P1 will be removed.
Furthermore, inconsistency removal in a program P occurs in this framework as
special case of updating (take, e.g., P1 = P and P2 = ∅).
From a computational point of view, abductive updates are—due to inherent
minimality criteria—harder than update programs; in particular, some abductive
reasoning problems are shown to be ΣP2 -complete (Inoue & Sakama, 1999).
7.5 Updates Through Priorities
Zhang and Foo (1998) described an approach for updating logic programs based
on their preference-handling framework for logic programs introduced in (Zhang
& Foo, 1997). The general approach is rather involved and proceeds in two stages,
roughly described as follows. For updating P1 with P2, in the first stage, each answer
set S of P1 is updated to a “closest” answer set S
′ of P2, where distance is measured
in terms of the set of atoms for which S and S′ have different truth values, and
closeness is set inclusion. Then, a maximal set of rules Q ⊆ P1 is chosen in such a
way that P3 = P2 ∪ Q has an answer set containing S′. In the second stage, P3 is
viewed as a prioritized logic program in which rules from P2 have higher priority
than rules from Q, and its answer sets are computed. The resulting answer sets are
identified as the answer sets of the update of P1 with P2.
This approach is apparently different from our update framework. In fact, it is
in the spirit of Winslett’s (1988) possible models approach, where the models of a
propositional theory are updated separately and which satisfies update postulate
(U8). More specifically, the two stages in Zhang and Foo’s approach respectively
aim at removing contradictory rules from P1 and resolving conflicts between the
remaining rules of P2. However, like in Inoue and Sakama’s approach, rules are not
removed on the basis of causal rejection. In particular, on the example considered
in (Zhang & Foo, 1998), both approaches yield the same result. The second stage
of the procedure indicates a strong update flavor of the approach, since rules are
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unnecessarily abandoned. For example, the update of P1 = {p ← not q} with
P2 = {q ← not p} results in P2, even though P1∪P2 is consistent. Since, in general,
the result of an update is given by a set of programs, naive handling of sequences
of updates consumes exponential space in general.
7.6 Compiled Preferences
Since the underlying conflict-resolution strategy of many update formalisms, in-
cluding the current one, is to associate, in some sense, “higher preference” to new
pieces of information, as final installment of our discussion on related work, we
briefly review the approach of Delgrande et al. (2000) to preference handling in
logic programming, which is also based on a transformational principle.
To begin with, Delgrande et al. (2000) define an ordered logic program as an ELP
in which rules are named by unique terms and in which preferences among rules
are given by a new set of atoms of the form s ≺ t, where s and t are names. Thus,
preferences among rules are encoded at the object-level. An ordered logic program
is transformed into a second, regular ELP wherein the preferences are respected,
in the sense that the answer sets obtained in the transformed theory correspond to
the preferred answer sets of the original theory. The approach is sufficiently general
to allow the specification of preferences among preferences, preferences holding in
a particular context, and preferences holding by default.
The encoding of ordered logic programs into standard ELPs is realized by means
of dedicated atoms, which control the applicability of rules with respect to the
intended order. More specifically, if rule r has preference over rule r′, the control
elements ensure that r is considered before r′, in the sense that, for a given answer
set S, rule r is known to be applied or defeated ahead of r′.
This control mechanism is more strict than the rejection principle realized in Def-
inition 2. For instance, in the preference approach, it may happen that no answer set
exists because the applicability of a higher-ranked rule depends on the applicability
of a lower-ranked rule, effectively resulting in a circular situation which cannot be
resolved in a consistent manner. On the other hand, this is not necessarily the case
in the current update framework, where newer rules may only be applicable given
older pieces of information. So, in order to simulate updates within the framework
of (Delgrande et al., 2000), under the proviso that newer information has prefer-
ence over older information, it is necessary to relax the conditions which enable
successive rule applications.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a formalization of an approach to sequences of logic
program updates based on a causal rejection principle for rules, which is inherent
to other approaches as well. We provided, in the spirit of dynamic logic program-
ming (Alferes et al., 1998; Alferes et al., 2000), a definition of the semantics of
sequences P of ELPs in terms of a simple transformation to update programs, P✁,
which are ordinary ELPs, and described a declarative semantical characterization
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as well. Then, as a main novel contribution, we investigated the properties of this
approach and of similar ones from the perspective of belief revision and nonmono-
tonic reasoning, based on the given characterization. For this purpose, we considered
different possibilities of interpreting update programs as theory change operators
and abstract nonmonotonic consequence operators, respectively. Our main findings
on this aspect were that many of the postulates and principles from these areas
are not satisfied by update programs. We then have introduced further properties,
including an iterativity property, and evaluated them on update programs.
Motivated by an apparent lack of minimality of change, we then considered re-
finements of the semantics in terms of minimal and strictly minimal answer sets,
and discussed their complexity and implementation. Furthermore, we compared
the current proposal to other related approaches, and found that it is semantically
equivalent to a fragment of inheritance logic programs as defined by Buccafurri
et al. (1999a). Moreover, our approach coincides on certain classes with dynamic
logic programming, which has been introduced by Alferes et al. (1998; 2000). For
the latter correspondence results, we provided exact characterizations in terms of
graph-theoretical conditions. In view of these results, our discussion on general prin-
ciples of update sequences based on causal rejection applies for these formalisms as
well.
Several issues remain for further work. An interesting point concerns the formu-
lation of postulates for update operators on logic programs and, more generally, on
nonmonotonic theories. As we have seen, several postulates from the area of logical
theory change fail for update programs (cf. (Brewka, 2000) for related observations
on this topic). This may partly be explained by the nonmonotonicity of answer sets
semantics, and by the dominant role of syntax for update embodied by causal re-
jection of rules. However, similar features are not exceptional in the context of logic
programming. Therefore, it would be interesting to consider further postulates and
desiderata for updating logic programs besides the ones we analyzed here, as well
as an AGM style characterization of update operators compliant with them. This
issue seems to be rather demanding, though, and we might speculate—without fur-
ther evidence—that it will be difficult to find a general acceptable set of postulates
which go beyond “obvious” properties.
A natural issue for update logic programs is the inverse of addition, i.e., re-
traction of rules from a logic program. Dynamic logic programming evolved into
LUPS (Alferes et al., 2000), which is a language for specifying update behavior in
terms of conditional addition and retraction of sets of rules to a logic program.
LUPS is generic, however, as in principle different approaches to updating logic
programs could provide the underlying semantical basis for the single update steps.
Exploring properties of the general framework, as well as of particular instanti-
ations, and reasoning about update programs describing the behavior of agents
programmed in LUPS or in other similar languages is topic of ongoing research.
Finally, building real-life applications, like intelligent information agents whose
rational component is modeled by a knowledge base, which is in turn maintained
using update logic programs, is an interesting issue for further research. The in-
tegration of reasoning components into agent architectures amenable to logic pro-
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gramming methods, such as the one of the IMPACT agent platform (Subrahmanian
et al., 2000), is an important next step in order to make the techniques available
to agent developers. This is also part of our current research.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
For any set U ⊆ LitA∗ , define U0 = U ∩ LitA, and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Ui =
{Li | Li ∈ U} and U
rej
i = {rej (r) | rej (r) ∈ U, r ∈ Pi}. Clearly, it holds that
U = U0 ∪
⋃n
i=1(Ui ∪ U
rej
i ).
Consider the answer sets S, T of P✁ and assume that S ∩ LitA = T ∩ LitA. We
show by induction on j (0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1) that Sn−j = Tn−j and S
rej
n−j = T
rej
n−j. From
this, and given the relation S0 = T0 (by the assumption S ∩ LitA = T ∩ LitA), it
follows that S = T .
Induction Base. Assume j = 0. First of all, it is quite obvious that Srejn = T
rej
n =
∅. Consider now some Ln ∈ LitA∗ . According to the construction of the transforma-
tion P✁, the literal Ln can only be derived by some rule Ln ← B(r), not rej (r) ∈
P✁, where r ∈ Pn. Since Srejn = T
rej
n = ∅, it follows that Ln ← B
+(r) must be a
member of both PS
✁
and PT
✁
. Since B+(r) ⊆ LitA and S0 = T0, we have B+(r) ⊆ S
iff B+(r) ⊆ T . Thus, Ln ∈ Sn iff Ln ∈ Tn. This implies Sn = Tn.
Induction Step. Assume n − 1 ≥ j > 0, and let the assertions Sn−k = Tn−k
and Srejn−k = T
rej
n−k hold for all k < j. We show that they hold for k = j as well.
Consider some atom rej (r) where r ∈ Pn−j . Given the transformationP✁, the atom
rej (r) can only be derived by means of rule rej (r) ← B(r),¬Ln−j+1 ∈ P✁. Since
B−(r) ⊆ LitA and S0 = T0, it holds that B−(r) ∩S = B−(r) ∩ T . Hence, rej (r)←
B+(r),¬Ln−j+1 is in P
S
✁
iff it is in PT
✁
. By induction hypothesis, ¬Ln−j+1 ∈ S iff
¬Ln−j+1 ∈ T . Since we also have that B+(r) ⊆ S iff B+(r) ⊆ T , it follows that
rej (r) ∈ S iff rej (r) ∈ T , and so Srejn−j = T
rej
n−j .
Consider now some literal Ln−j ∈ LitA∗ . This literal can only be derived by
means of rule Ln−j ← Ln−j+1, or by a rule of the form Ln−j ← B(r), not rej (r),
for some r ∈ Pn−j . If Ln−j is derived by Ln−j ← Ln−j+1, it follows immediately
from the induction hypothesis that Ln−j ∈ S iff Ln−j ∈ T . So assume now that the
second case applies. Since we already know that Srejn−j = T
rej
n−j , and since B
−(r)∩S =
B−(r)∩T , we have that Ln−j ← B+(r) lies in P
S
✁
iff it lies in PT
✁
. Again using the
property that B+(r) ⊆ S iff B+(r) ⊆ T , we obtain that Ln−j ∈ S iff Ln−j ∈ T .
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Combining the two cases, and since the literal Ln was arbitrarily chosen, it follows
that Sn−j = Tn−j.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Only-if part. Suppose S is an answer set of P = (P1, . . . , Pn). We show that S
is a minimal model of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S . First, we show that S is a model of
(∪P \ Rej (S,P))S .
Let Sˇ be the uniquely determined answer set of P✁ such that S = Sˇ ∩ LitA.
Consider some r+ ∈ (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S . We first assume that r is a constraint. So,
r ∈ P✁. Since B−(r) ∩ S = ∅, B−(r) ⊆ LitA, and S ⊆ Sˇ, we have B−(r) ∩ Sˇ = ∅.
Hence, B+(r) 6⊆ Sˇ, since Sˇ is an answer set of P✁ and r+ ∈ (P✁)Sˇ . It follows that
r+ is true in S. Let us now consider the case when r is not a constraint. Then,
there is some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that r ∈ Pi and r 6∈ Rej (S,P). We must show
that H(r) ∈ S whenever B+(r) ⊆ S. By construction of the update program P✁,
r induces some rule Li ← B(r), not rej (r) ∈ P✁, where L = H(r). We claim that
Li ← B(r), not rej (r) is not defeated by Sˇ. First of all, since B−(r) ∩ S = ∅, it
follows that B−(r) ∩ Sˇ = ∅, as argued above. Furthermore, since r 6∈ Rej (S,P),
Lemma 1 implies rej (r) /∈ Sˇ. This proves the claim. Thus, Li ← B+(r) ∈ (P✁)Sˇ .
Consequently, assuming B+(r) ⊆ S, it holds that Li ∈ Sˇ, since Sˇ is an answer set
of P✁ and S ⊆ Sˇ. Moreover, since (P✁)Sˇ contains the inertia rules Li ← Li+1
(1 ≤ i < n) and L ← L1, it follows that L ∈ Sˇ. By observing that L ∈ LitA,
L ∈ S follows, which implies that r+ is true in S. This concludes the proof that S
is a model of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S . It remains to show that S is a minimal model of
(∪P \ Rej (S,P))S .
Assume that S0 ⊂ S is a model of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S . Consider the set
S˜0 = Sˇ \ ({L | L ∈ S \ S0} ∪ {Li | L ∈ S \ S0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}).
It is easy to show that S˜0 is a model of (P✁)
Sˇ . Moreover, S˜0 ⊂ Sˇ. We arrive at a
contradiction, because Sˇ is assumed to be an answer set of P✁. As a consequence,
S must be a minimal model of (∪P \Rej (S,P))S . This concludes the proof that S
is a minimal model of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S whenever S is an answer set of P.
If part. Assume that S is a minimal model of (∪P \Rej (S,P))S . Define S˜ ⊆ LitA∗
as follows:
S˜ = S ∪ {rej(r) | r ∈ Rej (S,P)} ∪
n⋃
i=1
{Lj | 1 ≤ j ≤ i, ∃r ∈ Pi \ Rej (S,P) such that H(r) = L and S |= B(r)}.
We show that S˜ is an answer set of P✁. Since S˜ ∩ LitA = S, this will imply that S
is an answer set of P.
We first show that S˜ is a model of (P✁)
S˜ . Consider some r+ ∈ (P✁)S˜ . Depending
on the construction of P✁, there are several cases to distinguish.
(i) r is a constraint. Then, B+(r) 6⊆ S˜. Otherwise, we would have B+(r) ⊆ S and
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r+ ∈ (∪P\Rej (S,P))S (since S ⊆ S˜, B+(r) ⊆ LitA, and B−(r)∩ S˜ = ∅), violating
the condition that S is a model of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S . Thus, r+ is true in S˜.
(ii) r is a rule of form Li ← B(r
′), not rej (r′), where L = H(r′). Since r+ ∈
(P✁)S˜ , r
+ is not defeated by S˜ and rej (r′) 6∈ S˜. According to the definition of
S˜, the latter condition implies that r′ /∈ Rej (S,P). Since H(r) = Li, it holds that
r′ ∈ Pi, so r′ ∈ Pi\Rej (S,P). Assume B+(r′) ⊆ S˜. Since S ⊆ S˜ and B+(r′) ⊆ LitA,
we getB+(r′) ⊆ S. Moreover, since r is not defeated by S˜, the definition of S˜ implies
that Li ∈ S˜. This shows that r+ is true in S˜.
(iii) r is a rule of form rej (r′) ← B(r′),¬Li+1, where r′ ∈ Pi and L = H(r′).
Assume B+(r) ⊆ S˜. Hence, ¬Li+1 ∈ S˜. By definition of S˜, this implies that there
is some rule r′′ ∈ Pj \Rej (S,P), i+1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that H(r′′) = ¬L, B+(r′′) ⊆ S,
and r′′ is not defeated by S. Since Rej j(S,P) ⊆ Rej (S,P), it follows immediately
that r′ ∈ Rej i(S,P) ⊆ Rej (S,P), which in turn implies rej (r
′) ∈ S˜, by definition
of S˜, proving that r+ is true in S˜.
(iv) r is a rule of form Li ← Li+1 (1 ≤ i < n). Then r is trivially true in S˜, by
construction of S˜.
(v) r is a rule of form L← L1. If L1 ∈ S˜, then there is some r′ ∈ P1 \ Rej (S,P)
such that H(r′) = L, B+(r′) ⊆ S, and r′ is not defeated by S. Since S is a model
of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S , it follows that L ∈ S ⊆ S˜. Thus, r is true in S˜.
This concludes the proof that S˜ is a model of (P✁)
S˜ . We proceed by showing that
S˜ is a minimal model of (P✁)S˜ . Suppose S˜0 is a model of (P✁)S˜ such that S˜0 ⊂ S˜.
We show that this implies S˜ ⊆ S˜0, a contradiction. Hence, S˜ must be minimal.
Let us first assume that S˜0 ∩ LitA ⊂ S˜ ∩ LitA, i.e., S˜0 is smaller on the literals
in LitA. Then, for some L ∈ LitA, no rule r+ ∈ P S˜✁ with H(r) = Li fires in S˜0, i.e.,
B+(r) 6⊆ S˜0. Hence, by definition of S˜ and P S˜✁ , there is no r
′ ∈ (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S
such that H(r′) = L and B+(r′) ⊆ S. Consequently, S \ {L} satisfies all rules in
(∪P \ Rej (S,P))S . This, however, contradicts the fact that S is a minimal model
of (∪P \ Rej (S,P))S . It follows that S˜0 ∩ LitA = S˜ ∩ LitA holds.
Now consider any Li ∈ S˜. Then, there is a rule r ∈ Pj \ Rej (S,P), i ≤ j ≤ n,
such that B+(r) ⊆ S and r is not defeated by S. According to the definition
of P✁, and by Lemma 1, rule r introduces a rule Aj ← B+(r) ∈ (P✁)S˜ . Since
B+(r) ⊆ S = S˜ ∩ LitA and S˜ ∩ LitA = S˜0 ∩ LitA, it follows that Aj ∈ S˜0, by the
assumption that S˜0 is a model of (P✁)
S˜ . Moreover, since i ≤ j, the inertia rules
Lk ← Lk+1 ∈ (P✁)S˜ (1 ≤ k < n) imply Li ∈ S˜0.
Finally, consider rej (r) ∈ S˜, where r ∈ Pi. By the definitions of Rej (S,P) and
S˜, it follows that B+(r) ⊆ S, B−(r) ∩ S = ∅, and ¬Li+1 ∈ S˜. From the above
considerations, ¬Li+1 ∈ S˜ implies ¬Li+1 ∈ S˜0. Moreover, B−(r) ∩ S˜ = ∅. So,
rej (r) ← B+(r),¬Li+1 ∈ P
S˜
✁
. Since S˜0 is a model of (P✁)
S˜ , and given the fact
that S˜0 ∩ LitA = S, we obtain rej (r) ∈ S˜0. This concludes the proof that S˜ ⊆ S˜0.
A.3 Proofs of the Revision and Update Postulates
In what follows, we assume that P is a nonempty sequence (P1, . . . , Pn) of ELPs.
(K1) (P, P ) represents a belief set.
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This holds by convention.
(K2) & (U1) P ⊆ Bel((P, P )).
This is clearly satisfied, as the rules of P cannot be rejected in the updated program.
(U2) Bel(P ) ⊆ Bel (P) implies Bel((P, P )) = Bel (P).
This postulate states that no change occurs if the update is already entailed. This
means that inconsistency is preserved under updates and contradictions cannot be
removed by updates. This is clearly not the case : Updating P = {a← ,¬a←} with
P = {a ←} removes inconsistency. Also for a consistent P, update by a logically
implied rule may lead to a change in semantics. Consider, e.g., P = {a← not b} and
P = {b← not a}. Then P has the unique answer set S = {a}, and S |= b← not a.
However, (P, P ) has, besides S, another answer set S′ = {b}.
(K3) Bel((P, P )) ⊆ Bel (Bel(P) ∪ P ).
This property fails in general, if programs have infinite alphabets. This can be seen
by the following example. Let P = P1 and P = P2, where
P1 = {ai ← not bi, bi ← not ai, c← ai | i ≥ 1} ∪ { ← not c};
P2 = { ← bi | i ≥ 1}.
It is easy to see that every answer set S of P1 must contain c, and that either ai
or bi (but not both) are contained in S. Therefore, c ∈ Bel (P) holds. Furthermore,
S′ = {ai | i ≥ 1} ∪ {c} is an answer set of Bel(P). Since S′ |= P2, it follows that
S′ is an answer set of Bel (P) ∪ P . This implies Bel (Bel(P) ∪ P ) ⊂ Bel({←}), i.e.,
Bel(Bel (P) ∪ P ) does not contain all possible rules.
On the other hand, Bel((P, P )) = Bel({←}): Since negation does not occur in
rule heads of P1 and P2, we have Rej (S, (P, P )) = ∅, and thus U((P, P )) = S(P1 ∪
P2) holds. However, P1∪P2 clearly has no answer set, which implies Bel ((P, P )) =
Bel(P1 ∪ P2) = Bel({←}). It follows that Bel ((P, P )) 6⊆ Bel(Bel (P) ∪ P ), which
proves our claim.
That property (K3) holds if either P or P has a finite alphabet follows from (K7),
which subsumes (K3) by choosing P = ∅ in (K7), and by virtue of Bel((P, ∅)) =
Bel(P).
(U3) If both P and P are satisfiable, then (P, P ) is satisfiable.
This is clearly violated. Consider, e.g., P = P1 and P = P2, where
P1 = {a← b, not a};
P2 = {b← }.
(K4) If Bel(P) ∪ P has an answer set, then Bel (Bel(P) ∪ P ) ⊆ Bel ((P, P )).
The property is violated. Consider P1 = {a ← , b ← not c, c ← not b} and P2 =
{¬a ← b}. As easily seen, the sequence (P1, P2) has two answer sets, S = {b,¬a}
and S′ = {a, c}. On the other hand, since P1 ⊆ Bel(P1), S cannot be an answer set
of Bel(P1) ∪ P2; in fact, S′ is its unique answer set. Since, e.g., S′ |= c ← not a, b
whilst S 6|= c← not a, b, it follows that Bel (Bel(P1) ∪ P2) 6⊆ Bel ((P1, P2)).
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(K5) (P, P ) is unsatisfiable iff P is unsatisfiable.
This is violated, since contradictory rules in P are not affected unless they are
rejected by rules in P . For instance, if P consists of the single program {a ← ,
¬a← }, then the update of P by P = {b← } does not have an answer set.
(K6) & (U4) P ≡ P′ and P ≡ P ′ implies (P, P ) ≡ (P′, P ′).
This expresses irrelevance of syntax which is clearly not satisfied, since rejection of
rules depends on their syntactical form. For instances, take P = P′ = P1, P = P2,
and P ′ = P ′2, where
P1 = {a← , b← };
P2 = {¬a← b};
P ′2 = {¬b← a}.
Then clearly P ≡ P′ and P2 ≡ P ′2, but the resulting updates have different answer
sets: {¬a, b} is an answer set of (P1, P2) but not of (P1, P ′2).
(K7) & (U5) Bel ((P, P ∪ P ′)) ⊆ Bel(Bel ((P, P )) ∪ P ′).
The property does not hold if both P and P ′ (or P and P ′) have infinite alphabets,
which follows from the example showing the failure of (K3) (set P = ∅, and exploit
the relation Bel ((P, ∅)) = Bel (P)).
Property (K7) holds if (∪P)∪P or P ′ has a finite alphabet. Towards a contradic-
tion, suppose it fails. Then, there exists r ∈ Bel ((P, P ∪P ′))\Bel (Bel((P, P ))∪P ′),
and hence an answer set S ∈ S(Bel ((P, P )) ∪ P ′) such that S 6|= r.
ConsiderP′ = (P, P ), and letA′ denote the atoms in P′. Then, for every finite set
of atoms A0 ⊆ A′, there must exist some answer set SA0 of P
′ such that S and SA0
coincide with respect to A0. Indeed, Bel(P
′) must contain, for each interpretation
M which does not coincide with any answer set of P′ with respect to A0, the
constraint ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln, where {L1, . . . , Lm} = LitA0 ∩M
and {Lm+1, . . . , Ln} = LitA0 \ M , respectively. Furthermore, all answer sets of
Bel(P′) ∪ P ′ must coincide on the atoms in A \ A′. Thus, assuming that either P′
or P ′ has a finite alphabet, it follows that S is an answer set of P′ or P ′. Without
loss of generality, we assume that S is an answer set of P′.
Hence, Theorem 4 implies that S is a minimal model of ((∪P′) \ Rej (S,P′))S .
Since S |= P ′, we conclude that S is also a minimal model of (((∪P′) ∪ P ′) \
Rej (S,P))S . Furthermore, for the update sequence P′′ = (P, P ∪P ′), it holds that
Rej (S,P′′) = Rej (P′). Indeed, S |= r′ for all r′ ∈ P ∪ P ′, thus r′ /∈ Rej (S,P′) and
r /∈ Rej (S,P′′). Equivalence for the rules in P can be shown by induction on the
length of P. Hence, we obtain that S is a minimal model of ((∪P′′) \Rej (S,P′′))S .
From Theorem 4, we obtain that S is an answer set of P′′. Since S 6|= r, it follows
r /∈ Bel(P, P ∪ P ′), a contradiction.
(U6) Given Bel(P ′) ⊆ Bel((P, P )) and Bel (P ) ⊆ Bel((P, P ′)), then
Bel ((P, P )) = Bel((P, P ′)).
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This postulate fails. Consider, e.g., P = P1, P = P2, and P
′ = P3, where
P1 = { b← , d← };
P2 = { ¬a← ,¬e← d,¬d← e };
P3 = { ¬a← ,¬c← b,¬b← b }.
Then, {¬a, b, d,¬e} is the unique answer set of (P1, P2), and {¬a, b, d,¬c} is the
unique answer set of (P1, P3). Moreover, it is easily verified that ¬a ∈ S ∩ S′, for
any answer set S of P2 and any answer set S
′ of P3. Hence, Bel(P3) ⊆ Bel((P1, P2))
and Bel(P2) ⊆ Bel ((P1, P3)). However, Bel ((P1, P2)) 6= Bel((P1, P3)).
(K8) If Bel((P, P )) ∪ P ′ is satisfiable, then
Bel(Bel (P, P ) ∪ P ′) ⊆ Bel((P, P ∪ P ′)).
This postulate fails. Setting P = ∅, the property reduces to (K4) since Bel(P, ∅) =
Bel(P). The failure follows from the failure of (K4).
A.4 Proofs of the Postulates for Iterated Revision
(C1) If P ′ ⊆ Bel(P ), then Bel((P, P ′, P )) = Bel((P, P )).
Adding rules which are implied after the previous update does not change the
epistemic state. This is not satisfied: take, e.g., P = ∅, P = {b ← not a}, and
P ′ = {a ← not b}. Then (P, P ′, P ) has two answer sets, while (P, P ) has a single
answer set. The associated belief sets are thus different.
(C2) If S 6|= P ′, for all S ∈ S(P ), then Bel((P, P, P ′)) = Bel((P, P ′)).
This property is not satisfied. For a counterexample, consider P1 = {a ← b},
P2 = {b← }, and P3 = {¬b← not a}. Then (P1, P2, P3) has two answer sets, {a, b}
and {¬b}, whilst (P1, P3) possesses the single answer set {¬b}.
(C3) If P ′ ⊆ Bel((P, P )), then P ′ ⊆ Bel ((P, P ′, P )).
Implied rules can be added before the update. This property fails in general. For
example, let P = P1, P = P2, and P
′ = P3, where
P1 = ∅;
P2 = { a← not b, b← not a, g ← a, g ← not g, c← };
P3 = { g ←, ¬c← not a }.
Note that P2 has a single answer set, S = {a, g, c}, and clearly S |= P3. However,
(P1, P3, P2) has among its answer sets S
′ = {b, g, c}, and S′ 6|= ¬c← not a.
The property holds, however, providing P ′ contains a single rule. Suppose P ′ ⊆
Bel((P, P )) but r /∈ Bel ((P, P ′, P )), for P ′ = {r}. Then, r ∈ Rej(S, (P, P ′, P )) for
some answer set S of (P, P ′, P ). This means, however, that S is an answer set of
(P, P ) (as r cannot reject any rule in P). Thus, r /∈ Bel ((P, P )).
(C4) If S |= P ′ for some S ∈ U((P, P )), then S |= P ′ for some S ∈ U((P, P ′, P )).
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This property holds. By hypothesis, there exists some S ∈ U((P, P )) such that
S |= P ′. By Theorem 4, S is a minimal model of
(
((∪P) ∪ P ) \ Rej (S, (P, P ))
)S
.
Since S |= P ′ and S |= P (due to S ∈ U((P, P ))), no rule r′ ∈ P ′ can be rejected
by a rule r of P . Also, r′ can reject a rule r′′ in P only if r′′ is rejected within P .
Thus, Rej (S, (P, P )) = Rej (S, (P, P ′, P )), and S is a minimal model of
(
((∪P) ∪ P ′ ∪ P ) \ Rej (S, (P, P ′, P ))
)S
.
This means, by Theorem 4, that S is an answer set of (P, P ′, P ).
(C5) If S 6|= P ′ for all S ∈ U((P, P )) and P 6⊆ Bel((P, P ′)), then
P 6⊆ Bel ((P, P, P ′)).
This property fails: just consider P = ∅, P = {a← }, and P ′ = {b← }.
(C6) If S 6|= P ′ for all S ∈ U((P, P )) and S 6|= P for all S ∈ U((P, P ′)), then
S 6|= P for all S ∈ U((P, P, P ′)).
This property fails as well, which can be seen by the counterexample for (C5),
setting P = ∅. Another counterexample for (C6)—which does not exploit minimiza-
tion of answer sets—is P = {¬b← , ¬a← b}, P = {a← }, and P ′ = {b← }.
(I1) Bel (P) is a consistent belief set.
This is clearly violated in general.
(I2) P ⊆ Bel((P, P )).
The postulate is easily seen to be satisfied (cf. (K2) and (U1)).
(I3) If L0 ← ∈ Bel ((P, {L1 ← , . . . , Lk ← })), then
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lk ∈ Bel (P).
This property holds. Suppose there is some S ∈ U(P) such that {L1, . . . , Lk} ⊆ S
but L0 /∈ S. Let P
′ = (P, {L1 ← , . . . , Lk ← }). Then, the following holds: For
every rule r in P′, r ∈ Rej (S,P′) iff r ∈ Rej (S,P). Indeed, each Li (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
is neither in Rej (S,P′) nor in Rej (S,P). By Theorem 4, S is a minimal model of
((∪P) \Rej (S,P))S . It follows that S is a minimal model of ((∪P′) \Rej (S,P′))S ,
which in turn implies, by using Theorem 4 again, that S ∈ U(P). Since L0 /∈ S, we
obtain L0 ← /∈ Bel(P
′).
(I4) If Q1 ⊆ Bel(P), then Bel ((P, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn)) = Bel((P, Q2, . . . , Qn)).
This property fails. Consider P = {a← not b} and Q1 = {b← not a} for n = 1.
(I5) If Bel (Q2) ⊆ Bel(Q1), then
Bel ((P, Q1, Q2, Q3, . . . , Qn)) = Bel ((P, Q2, Q3, . . . , Qn)).
This property fails, because it generalizes (C1), which fails.
(I6) If S |= Q2 for some S ∈ U((P, Q1)), then
Bel ((P, Q1, Q2, Q3, . . . , Qn)) = Bel ((P, Q1, Q1 ∪Q2, Q3, . . . , Qn)).
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The property fails: Let P = {a ← not b, b ← not a}, Q1 = {c ← }, and Q2 =
{¬c← a}. Then, S = {c, b} is an answer set of (P, Q1) such that S |= Q2. However,
(P, Q1, Q2) has two answer sets, S1 = {a,¬c} and S2 = {c, b}, whilst (P, Q1, Q1 ∪
Q2) has the single answer set {c, b}.
A.5 Proofs of the Postulates of Updates as Nonmonotonic
Consequence Relations
(N1) P1 ∈ Bel((P, P1)).
This is clearly satisfied (cf. (K2), (U1), and (I2)).
(N2) If
⋃m
i=1Qi ⊆ Bel ((P, P1)) and P2 ⊆ Bel ((P, P1 ∪
⋃m
i=1Q1)), then
P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1)).
The property holds. Let Q =
⋃m
i=1Qi and P
′ = (P, P1). Assume Q ⊆ Bel(P
′)
and P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1 ∪ Q)), and consider some answer set S of P
′. Then, S |= Q.
Moreover, Sˇ is an answer set of P′
✁
∪Q. Since Q ⊆ Bel(P′), it follows that for each
rule s ∈ Q rejecting a rule r from P, there exists a rule r1 ∈ P1 also rejecting r.
Hence, no further rule in P can be rejected usingQ. Let P′′ = (P, P1∪Q). Then, Sˇ is
an answer set ofP′′
✁
, so S is an answer set of (P, P1∪Q). Since P2 ⊆ Bel ((P, P1∪Q)),
we obtain S |= P2. This proves the property.
(N3) If
⋃m
i=1Qi ⊆ Bel ((P, P1)) and P2 ⊆ Bel ((P, P1)), then
P2 ⊆ Bel((P, P1 ∪
⋃m
i=1Q1)).
The property fails: Consider the counterexample P = ∅, P1 = {a ← not b}, P2 =
{a← }, and, for m = 1, Q1 = {b← not a}.
(N4) If Pi+1 ⊆ Bel ((P, Pi)) (1 ≤ i < n) and P1 ⊆ Bel((P, Pn)) (n ≥ 2), then
{P ′ | P ′ ⊆ Bel ((P, Pi))} = {P ′ | P ′ ⊆ Bel((P, Pj))}, for all i, j ≤ n.
The property does not hold, because it includes (U6) as a special case, which fails.
(P1) If P1 ≡ P2 and P3 ⊆ Bel((P, P1)), then P3 ⊆ Bel((P, P2)).
The property fails, due to the following counterexample: P = {a ← , b ← }, P1 =
{¬a← b}, P2 = {¬b← a}, and P3 = {b← }.
(P2) If P1 |= P2 and P1 ⊆ Bel((P, P3)), then P2 ⊆ Bel ((P, P3)).
This property does not hold. For a counterexample, consider P = ∅, P1 = {a ←
not b}, P2 = {a← }, and P3 = {b← ,¬a← }.
(P4) If P2 ⊆ Bel ((P, P1)) and P3 ⊆ Bel ((P, P1)), then P2 ∪ P3 ⊆ Bel ((P, P1)).
The property is trivially satisfied.
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